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ABSTRACT
This thesis is aimed at analyzing how and why the division and privatization
of the Japanese National Railways (JNR), or the JNR Reform, re-vitalized
JNR's railroad enterprise, which had suffered from many problems,
including huge financial losses, inefficiency, and service issues.
In Chapter 1, the author describes about the JNR problems, necessity of the
division and privatization, details of the policies taken as part of the JNR
Reform, and the implementation of the reform.
Then, in Chapter 2, the author introduces major post-reform topics, such as
the implementation of the JNR Reform and new government policies on
capital investment in railroad infrastructure.
Next, the effects of the reform, such as financial performance, service level,
management, and labor-management relationships, are discussed in Chapter
3. It is shown that the division and privatization of the JNR Reform brought
about management and labor incentives and resulted in improved
performance.
In Chapter 4, the author discusses general lessons of the reform.
In Chapter 5, based on the evaluation of the policies implemented during and
after the JNR Reform, the author draws suggestions for other foreign
railroads considering privatization and the new private railroad companies
which the JNR Reform created (the JR-Companies).
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1. What Was the .NR Reform?
1.1 Outline of the JNR Reform
On April 1, 1987, the Japanese National Railways (JNR), which
operated Japan's nationwide railroad network since 1949, was
divided and privatized into regional six passenger companies, one
nationwide freight company, and several other companies and
corporations. This organizational reform was aimed at solving JNR's
financial and managerial difficulties and ensuring national railroad
service.
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the effect of the reform
(the JNR Reform) by reviewing the performance of the privatized
companies (the JR Companies) and derive some lessons both for the
future of the JR Companies and other railroads thinking about
privatization.
JNR began to take a loss in 1964 and accumulated huge long-term
debt, which amounted to 14.4 trillion yen (137 billion U.S. dollars if a
dollar equals to 105 yen), five times as large as its annual revenue,
in 1980. It was known that the JNR had many problems in labor
productivity, management, labor-management relationships, and the
ways of political controls. In the 1980's, the national government
concluded that JNR's organization -- a nationwide public corporation
-- was the fundamental reason for JNR's managerial failure, and
enforced the JNR Reform.
The fundamental elements of the JNR Reform are as follows:
11
(1) Organizational Reform
JNR's organization was essentially the cause of its managerial
failure. Being a public corporation resulted in a lack of independence
and responsibility. A nationwide, single organization was too big to
deal with local needs adequately.
The JNR Reform was to divide and privatize JNR into one freight
and six passenger companies.
- (2) Financial Restructuring
The new private companies were planned to ensure sound
financial conditions for the companies under efficient management.
60 percent of JNR's liabilities was separated from railroad operation.
(3) Change of Labor
The size of work force was cut to achieve high productivity as in
private railroads.
(4) Reaffirmation of Efficiency and Sound Management in
Railroads
JNR could not achieve efficiency, which was one of its goals, due to
its managerial failure and political control. An organization reform
was called for to eliminate those causes.
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(5) Established Idea of Railroads' Role
JNR had to continue services for which other modes were more
suitable. After the Reform, the railroad was expected to use the
capability of railroad appropriately.
(6) Improved Management
Through the organizational reform, the new companies were
expected to improve management, such as cost control, adequate
service, and labor-management relationship.
(7) Improved Service
The new companies were expected to improve service so that
railroads would use the capability of railroad appropriately.
1.2 Background (1) -- Brief History of the JNR Problem
The first railroad in Japan was opened in 1872 by the
government. Subsequently, national and private railroads formed a
nationwide network. In 1906 most lines except urban and local lines
were nationalized; the Japanese military and industry wanted a
single operator for efficient operation.
In 1949, the Japanese National Railways, a nationwide public
corporation, was established to give some freedom and independence
for management of the railroad which the Ministry of Railways had
operated. It was also aimed at forbidding strikes in exchange for the
guarantee of employment as government officials. As the JNR Act
13
said, the national goals in establishing this public corporation were to
operate efficiently and to promote public welfare. However, the two
goals were incompatible with each other after JNR began to lose its
monopoly power in competition with automobiles and airplanes; the
public welfare goals, such as national economical development and
equity were emphasized more than efficiency.
In the late 1950's, JNR had recovered from overuse and damage
during and after World War Two, and its financial condition was
good. However, as the Japanese economy developed rapidly, road
and air transportation expanded their shares, as shown in Figures 1-
1 and 1-2, due to several changes in the transportation market:
(1) The income level went up, so people could afford to buy
automobiles and use airplanes.
(2) Highways and airports were constructed after the war.
(3) The freight transportation market changed greatly. First,
heavy industries emerged and were located by new modemrn ports.
Japan has to rely on imported raw materials, and such locations
made exporting products easier. Second, coal mining declined.
Hence, domestic shipping maintained its share in freight
transportation, but less raw materials were to be carried by land.
Despite the worldwide reputation and the commercial success of
the bullet train, or Shinkansen, which began to operate in 1964, JNR
became unprofitable in the same year. JNR's passenger and freight
traffic also began to decrease in the 1970's, as Figures 1-3 and 1-4
14
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show; in addition to the changes in the transportation market,
strikes, which were illegal, sabotage, and fare increases were part of
the cause of the traffic decrease.
An underlying problem in the failure of those restructuring plans
was the political control imposed upon JNR in the name of public
welfare. For example, JNR could abolish few rural lines; it even built
some new rural lines. The goals of having rural lines were not only
to provide public transportation to local communities but also to
contribute to regional development, which is an important policy
objective in Japan. In fact, however, politicians were understandably
concerned about local interests of the region from which they were
elected. Another example is that the Diet suppressed and often
rejected fare increases as part of price suppression policies for public
service; JNR's fare was set by the JNR Fare Act until 1977.
Consequently JNR could not increase its revenue as it expected.
JNR's low labor productivity was another cause of its deficit. In
FY1980 1, the average revenue per employee was 10.3 million and
5.3 million yen for private railroads and JNR respectively 2. The
government pointed out that JNR's labor productivity was lower than
that of private railroads (The Prime Minister's Office, 1984, p. 111).
Take an example of train drivers. In a private railroad, the average
daily work hours exceeded the standard which the labor agreement
had set to 6 hours and 34 minutes in all of the railroad's ten depots;
1 In this thesis, FY means fiscal year. Japanese fiscal year begins on April 1.
For example, FY1993 begins on April 1, 1993 and ends on March 31, 1994.
2 Calculated from the Ministry of Transport, Suuji de Miru Tetsudou 1992, 1992,
pp. 94-95.
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the drivers were paid allowances for extra work. JNR's average of
works hours was 6 hours and 16 minutes, while the standard was 6
hours and 40 minutes. The difference of 24 minutes per day per
employee was a waste of personnel expense. Such a waste was due
to JNR's labor agreement, which could not be changed because JNR's
labor unions were so strong.
Since 1969, four restructuring plans of JNR were planned and
failed successively.
(1) The first plan (FY1969) was to eliminate the deficit by FY1978
by reducing 60,000 employees. The plan was stopped in FY1972
because revenue was below expectations because of low traffic
growth.
(2) The second plan (FY1973) was to reduce 110,000 employees
by FY1982. Due to the Oil Shock, revenue and increase differed
much from expectations, and the plan was given up in 1974.
(3) The third plan (FY1976) included the deregulation of fare. JNR
raised its fare by about 50 percent, but JNR lost traffic. In addition,
the fare increase was behind schedule. Thus, the plan failed.
(4) The fourth plan (FY1979) included the abandonment of rural
lines, reduction of the labor force, and the government's expense for
JNR's liabilities. It was replaced by the division and privatization of
JNR, which was proposed in 1982.
19
The change of JNR's long-term debt and annual loss is shown in
Table 1-1 and Figure 1-5. JNR's loss was increasing exponentially; its
long-term debt amounted to 14.4 trillion yen in 1980.
JNR's deterioration in management and finance was perceivable to
passengers. JNR's fare became much higher than private railroads, as
shown in Figure 1-6; it raised passenger fares 11 times during
FY1974 - FY1986. Until the mid 1970's, labor unions repeated illegal
strikes; JNR's poor labor-management relationships were well-
known. In 1982, JNR's deteriorated work rule and morale were
reported sensationally by mass media and caused public distrust of
JNR's management and labor. Still JNR had an important role in
Japanese passenger transportation; in FY1980, its share in passenger-
km amounted to 24.5 percent, while JNR carried only 8.3 percent of
freight traffic in ton-km.
1.3 Background (2) -- Existing Private Railroads
Since 1883, when the first private railroad began service, private
railroads formed a nationwide network with the national railroad. In
1906, the nationwide network was nationalized, and only local
service was left to private operators. Nonetheless, as urbanization
began in the 1910's, private railroads in urban areas began to
develop as urban/suburban rapid transit.
Private railroads were active to engage in related business such
as retail and real estate. Since the 1950's, related business
20
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Figure 1-6 Comparison
developed quickly, due to Japan's economic development and
urbanization.
Existing private railroads have an important role in Japanese
passenger transportation. For instance, they carried 13 percent of
the entire Japanese passenger traffic and 39 percent of the entire
railroad passenger-km in 1990. In large urban areas, such as Tokyo
and Osaka, their fare was lower than JNR's; still they are profitable.
In rural areas, automobiles competed strongly, but many lines have
survived; few of them receive subsidies for operating losses.
Many private railroads earn as much or more from their related
business than from their railroad operation. Related businesses of
private railroads were considered desirable, for they can take
advantage of the positive externality of railroad service. For
example, most of their department stores are located near their own
stations, so they attract railroad passengers to their stores; they
develop land along their lines, and they can make a large profit if
they could buy the land before the construction of the lines.
1.4 The Process to the Proposal of the JNR Reform
In 1981, Rinji Gyousei Chousakai (Administrative Reform
Meeting) was established to solve the government's deficit and raise
administrative efficiency. The restructuring of JNR was also
discussed there, for the nation would have to pay JNR's huge debt
some day. In July 1982, the meeting issued reports 3 which proposed
3 See Rinji Gyousei Chousakai, Rinii Gyousei Chousakai Dai 4 Bukai Houkoku,
1982; Rinji Gyousei Chousakai, Rinii Gvousei Chousakai Kihon Toushin, 1982
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to divide and privatize JNR within five years. The meeting listed
four causes of JNR's financial failure, some of which have been
already discussed in this thesis:
(1) Inadequate Response to the Change of the Transportation Market
JNR had been losing its share in the transportation market in the
competition with other modes (See Section 1.2). JNR should have
specialized in the areas which were suitable for railroads, such as
intercity passenger transportation, urban transit, and
unit/intermodal freight trains. It should have retreated from the
areas where railroads had lost their advantage, such as rural lines,
and rationalize freight service. However, the goal of public interests
was heavily emphasized, and JNR was very slow in adopting those
countermeasures.
(2) Irresponsible Management
Due to several causes, JNR failed to take advantage of being a
corporation. First, the Diet and the government intervened in JNR's
management excessively. Second, JNR was too large to control.
Third, JNR also lacked the sense of being a corporation and the
responsibility for management.
Consequently, huge unprofitable capital investment was made
despite the financial crisis. Also fares were raised repeatedly to
increase income, without sufficient improvements of productivity.
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(3) Unstable Labor-Management Relationships
JNR's labor-management relationships were unstable and work
discipline had deteriorated. Low labor productivity, which was the
consequence, was a major cause of JNR's deficit.
(4) Other Features of JNR's Abnormal Financial Circumstance
(a) High Ratio of Personnel Expenses to Operating Revenue -- 82
percent in FY1980 (private railroads' ratio was 45 percent then); the
personnel expenses and the operating revenue were 2.2 and 2.67
trillion respectively.
(b) The Burden of ,NR's Pension and Retirement Allowance -- JNR's
expense amounted to 0.7 trillion yen (32 percent to the total
personnel expenses) in FY1980 and was increasing.
(c) Huge and Swelling Interest Payments for the Long-Term
Liabilities -- 0.48 trillion yen in FY1980, anticipated to increase to
0.85 trillion in FY1982
To develop and execute the measures for reforming JNR, the JNR
Reform Commission was inaugurated in the next year, as the
Administrative Reform Meeting proposed in the July 1982 report.
JNR's executives were split -- pro and con. The group which opposed
"division and privatization" once had the control of JNR; in January
1985 it published its own reform proposal to reorganize it into a
nationwide private company. The ruling group was not cooperative
with the commission. In June 1985 Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone had JNR's president resign along with other executives who
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were against the commission. The new president and the supporters'
group cooperated with the commission, and on July 26, 1985, the
commission submitted the final proposal of the JNR Reform, or
"Opinions in JNR Restructuring," which described a specific plan to
establish new organizations and to deal with surplus employees and
long-term debt.
1.5 The Objectives of the JNR Reform
The JNR Reform was aimed at realizing efficient operation and
establishing sound management of JNR enterprises to have the
railroad use its own capability appropriately.
First, the Reform was aimed at establishing sound management.
"Sound management" implies many things such as financial condition
and labor-management relationship. The Reform Commission
claimed that JNR's organization itself -- a nationwide public
corporation -- was the cause of its management failure, as this thesis
describes later. The commission then proposed a substantial
organizational change -- regionally divided, private firms. When
operated efficiently, the railroad enterprises were considered to be
profitable businesses. The "Opinions" proposal stated the following:
"Under efficient management, the railroad enterprises can make a
profit if the demand is large enough, as in Japanese private railroads.
--- While the average traffic density in European railroads is about
5,000 passengers per day, JNR has a considerably high density of
about 25,000. Accordingly, we consider that JNR enterprises could
be rehabilitated under an immediate substantial reform."
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Second, the JNR Reform was also aimed at rescuing the national
budget though efficient operation. The discussion of the JNR Reform
initiated by the Administrative Reform Meeting to cut government
expenses and reduce the government's domestic debt. The very
beginning of the "Opinions" proposal" is as follows:
"This Commission was founded for investigating how to establish
efficient operation of JNR enterprises --- "
Efficiency did not only imply lowering costs by raising labor
productivity and so on; it also included managerial aspects such as
slashing unprofitable service and poorly conceived capital
investment.
Third, the ultimate objective of the JNR Reform was to have the
railroad use its own capability properly. The commission forecast
that the market share of the railroad would keep declining, as in
Table 1-2, but asserted that the railroad had the advantage over
other modes in several market areas:
(1) Medium-Distance (300-750km) Intercity Passenger
Transportation, Mainly by Shinkansen (Figure 1-7);
(2) Urban/Suburban Transit;
(3) Bulk Freight (Oil, Cement, etc.) and Long-Distance TOFC.
On the other hand, the commission encouraged the contraction in
rural service and commodity-freight services, in which the railroad
had no advantage.
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Table 1-2 JNR Reform Commission's Prediction of Traffic Volume
ACTUAL FORECAST
FY1975 FY1983 FY1990 FY2000
Share Share Share Share
Automobiles 360,868 50.8 464,162 56.5 554,737 60.2 609,800 62.4
Air 19,148 2.7 30,627 3.7 43,557 4.7 54,307 5.6
Ships 6,895 1 5,722 0.7 5,303 0.6 4,727 0.5
Railroads
Shinkansen 53,318 7.5 50,440 6.1 49,671 5.4 55,020 5.6
Other JNR 161,971 22.8 142,446 17.4 135,443 14.7 125,269 12.8
Total JNR 215,289 30.3 192,906 23.5 185,114 20.1 180,289 18.4
Private R.R. 108,511 15.3 128,546 15.6 132,719 14.4 128,565 13.1
Total R.R. 323,800 45.6 321,452 39.1 317,833 34.5 308,854 31.6
Total Traffic 710,711 100 821,963 100 921,430 100 977,688 100
unit of traffic: million passenger-km
unit of share: percent
Source: Kokutetsu Saiken Kanri Iinkai, 1985
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Figure 1-7 Share by Distance
Source: Kokutetsu Saiken Kanri Iinkai, 1985
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The commission argued that sound management would enable the
railroad to accomplish its role in the future. Current poor
management was considered a threat to this goal; the "Opinions"
proposal asserted as follows:
"It is not possible to accumulate huge debt infinitely; some day
financial crisis will come, and there may be difficulty even in
continuing everyday operation."
"In addition, as there is no clear perspective on the future of JNR,
its employees can not find any future hopes, and there is a decline of
workers' morale, as current deteriorated work rules imply. --- If
such situation is not changed, JNR will have a difficulty in
maintaining its function in the near future ---."
1.6 Why Division and Privatization?
1.6.1 Necessity to Reorganize the Nationwide Public
Corporation
The "Opinions" proposal discussed that JNR's organization -- a
nationwide public corporation -- was the cause of its managerial
failure, and hence it should be divided and privatized. The
"Opinions" proposal said, "The primary cause of JNR's managerial
failure is found in JNR's organization itself --- We consider that the
revival of the JNR's businesses can be achieved only with
substantially reforming the organization of the nationwide public
corporation."
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"JNR had been almost profitable with its monopolistic power.
However, during Japan's high economic growth since the mid 1950's,
the industrial structure changed, and the national income rose.
Hence, competition with automobiles and aircraft got more severe,
and JNR's strength over other modes was lost rapidly both in
passenger and freight."
"Despite such changes of circumstances around railroads, JNR
could not respond to them by modifying management or improving
productivity adequately. This is the largest cause for JNR's failure."
"We concluded that the inadequate response to the market is due
to the present organization, nationwide public corporation with
nationwide mammoth organization."
According to the "Opinions," the public corporation had four
inherent problems:
(1) External Intervention: The public corporation was subject to
strong governmental control in budget, personnel affairs of
executives, fares, major investments, and so on. Due to the citizens'
excessive expectations for railroads, such external intervention often
led to bad decisions outside free control of the JNR management. For
example, fare increases were often postponed; very unprofitable
lines were constructed.
(2) Lacking Independence of Management and Its Conseauence --
Unclear Responsibility for Management: Top executives in JNR had
limited power of decision. Their responsibility for management was
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unclear. Hence, they lost the motivation for better management and
failed to do what they can do. Consequently, JNR had a poor service
level and low productivity compared to private railroads.
(3) Abnormal Labor-Management Relationships: JNR could not have
normal labor-management negotiations because JNR's management
did not have enough authority. For instance, JNR's wage was actually
determined by other governmental organizations which dealt with
the wages of governmental workers, while private companies could
offer wage increase reflecting the companies' performance. At the
same time, labor unions lacked the sense of productivity and cost;
JNR would never go bankrupt, and JNR's management was affected
by external intervention.
(4) Limitation on Related Business: JNR's related business was very
limited legally due to its mission of public welfare. It could not take
advantage of externalities related to railroad service, although
private railroads did so successfully in retail, real estate, and others.
As for being a single nationwide organization, the problems are as
follows:
(1) Exceeding the Limit of Manageable Scale: JNR was a mammoth
organization with many employees and exceeded the limit of
manageable scale;
(2) Standardized Management: The nationwide organization carried
out standardized management and did not have enough
consideration to local needs;
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(3) Irrational Dependence: In a nationwide organization, regions and
departments had unclear financial responsiblity, were dependent on
each other, and became ineffcient;
(4) Lack of the Sense of Competition: As JNR had no similar
enterprises which had nationwide railroad networks, it could not
compare itself with similar companies. The privatized companies
would feel competitive because they would be compared with each
other, as electric power companies and existing private railroads
were.
Referring to successful Japanese private railroads repeatedly,
"Opinions" proposed to change the public corporation and the
nationwide single organization at the same time.
1.6.2 Division and Privatization will not Cause Any
Disadvantages for Customers
(1) Maintaining Rural Lines
One public concern was that the division and privatization would
cause the abolishment of unprofitable rural lines. The "Opinions"
proposal said that the division and privatization would not eliminate
but rather activate rural lines which the privatized companies would
take over.
"Some people argue that the division and privatization result in
the abandonment of unprofitable lines. Some also say that few lines
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will remain in the areas, such as Hokkaido, which have many rural
lines, if the present organization is not continued.
However, as we stated before, it is clear that the current situation
will get even worse through symptomatic treatments based on the
present institutional framework, which was the fundamental cause of
JNR's crisis. So long as the operation is standardized under a public
corporation, it is impossible to expect active management based on
specific affairs in the regions. Hence, most railroads may be
abolished in some regions. If we perform a substantial reform of
division and privatization, vitalized management which is close to the
regions can be accomplished, and railroads can eventually be
activated and survive as a basic transportation for residents."
(2) Eliminating Inconveniences Caused by Division
As for potential inconveniences caused by the division, "Opinions"
listed eight major potential problems:
(a) Potential discontinuation of present long distance fare discounts
(b) Potential discontinuation of operations between the companies
(c) Adjustment of the train schedule among the companies
(d) Distribution of fares of passengers to the companies
(e) Potential decline in the efficiency of crews
(f) Special free-ride tickets whose areas cover more than one
company
(g) Potential lack of the ability to catch up the train schedule
(h) Safety problems due to potential differences of operational rules
among companies
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The commission said that the eight problems would not occur
under adequate agreements among the companies, for the customers'
convenience should result in the companies' benefit.
(3) Safety
In the discussion of the JNR Reform, government officials said that
safety will be maintained despite the labor cut, for private railroads
were safe, while maintaining high labor productivity.
1.7 The Reform Plan
1.7.1 Key Issues
The reform plan in the "Opinions" proposal, which was issued in
July 1985, consisted of the following key issues:
(a) Division and Privatization of JNR;
The "Opinions" proposal stated that JNR should be divided into six
regional private passenger companies and one nationwide private
freight company.
(b) Labor Cuts
To attain high labor productivity as in existing private railroads,
the "Opinions" proposal requested extensive labor cuts;
(c) Financial Plans
The "Opinions" proposal estimated that the new companies could
bear nearly 40 percent of "JNR's long-term liabilities," (which will be
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defined in Section 1.7.4,) by becoming as efficient as existing private
railroads. The government was expected to take steps to dispose of
the remaining liabilities.
1.7.2 Organization
The proposed organizational change is shown in Figure 1-8. The
"Opinions" proposal stated that:
(1) JNR's passenger service should be divided into six operators
regionally, later named as follows (Figure 1-9);
Three companies in Honshu Island (main island)
--- East Japan Railway Company (JR East)
-- Central Japan Railway Company (JR Central)
--- West Japan Railway Company (JR West)
Three companies in other three islands (so-called Three Island
Companies)
--- Hokkaido Railway Company (JR Hokkaido)
--- Shikoku Railway Company (JR Shikoku)
--- Kyushu Railway Company (JR Kyushu)
Their borders were decided so that the traffic that would cross the
borders would be minimal, considering current train operation and
the borders of JNR's branch offices. The three companies in Honshu
Island were expected to operate the Shinkansen lines.
(2) JNR's freight service should be separated from the passenger
companies and be a nationwide company, later named Japan Freight
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Railway Company (JR Freight), for the railroad carried mainly long-
distance freight. The company should have only trackage rights and
pay avoidable costs for using tracks 4.
(3) JNR's telecommunication and seat reservation system should be
taken over by other new companies, for they served all the railroad
companies. Their stocks should be shared by the railroad companies.
(4) JNR's research organizations, Railway Technical Research
Institute and Railway Labor Science Research Institute should be
separated from the railroad operators and transformed into a non-
profit institute, the Railway Technical Research Institute. Its cost
would be shared by the railroad companies.
(5) As the companies' long-term liabilities would be equal to the
book values of their assets (Section 1.7.4), the profit (net income) of
the passenger companies would differ greatly without any other
financial countermeasures. Hence, the following countermearures
were proposed to establish financial viability of each company.
First, the profit would differ greatly among the three companies
which would operate Shinkansen, for the book value of each line did
not reflect its revenue at all. The oldest Shinkansen line had been
built in the busiest corridor, hence it had the largest revenue, while
its book value was the smallest. Assigning debt based on present or
forecasted financial condition as a financial countermeasure was
4 The "Opinions" left the rules among the freight and passenger companies to
the government's investigation. That rule of avoidable cost was proposed in
December 1985.
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considered risky because the actual revenue of the Shinkansen lines
might be different from the forecast. For this purpose, the
Shinkansen Holding Corporation would be established to take over
Shinkansen's infrastructure and rent it to the three companies
operating Shinkansen. The three companies would pay the leasing
fee for using the infrastructure based on the Shinkansen traffic of
each company. It was forecast that the three companies would make
profits under this system, as indicated in Section 1.7.4.
Second, the Three Island Companies would take losses, for they
would have few profitable lines and many rural lines. A financial
countermeasure would be taken, as described in the next section.
(6) The new organizations would take over necessary assets and
employees, and part of the liabilities from JNR. JNR would be
transformed into the JNR Settlement Corporation (JNRSC), which
would take over the remaining assets, employees, and liabilities. It
would introduce new jobs ex-JNR workers who would lose their jobs
until 1990 (Section 1.7.3); it would also return JNR's long-term
liabilities, which the JR Companies would not take over, partly by
selling JNR's land (which the JR Companies would not succeed) and
partly by selling the JR Companies' stock.
(7) The nation should establish the companies. Their stocks would
belong to JNRSC; when the new companies established their financial
viability, the stocks would be sold to the public so that the companies
would be purely private companies.
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(8) The companies should have the independence and responsibility
of the management as close to those of existing private railroads as
possible; additional national regulations should be minimal. (Later
the regulations were determined as in Table 1-3.) In particular, the
freedom for related businesses should be openly permitted.
These additional national regulations would exist because the the
government would own the stocks. That is why listing was
considered the step toward purely private companies. Nonetheless,
the companies would be far more independent and responsible than
JNR was; in addition to financial responsibilities, they would have no
Diet interventions in their budget plans and fares.
(9) Employees should have basic labor rights, including legal strikes,
as do the employees of existing private railroads.
(10) JNR's buses, ferry boats and related business should be divided
and operated by the new companies.
1.7.3 Labor Force
The JNR Reform Commission proposed the labor force of the JR
Companies to be 215,000, which is broken down as follows:
(a) Considering JNR's long-distance services, the passenger railroads'
operation would need 158,000 workers to achieve the same level of
productivity as existing private railroads;
(b) JNR's bus operation (which the passenger companies would take
over) and the related business would need 10,000 employees;
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(c) The passenger companies should take over surplus workers
amounting to two-tenths of their adequate railroad work force. This
surplus labor force was considered necessary; first, it would take
time beyond the 1987 deadline to achieve the high productivity of
existing private railroads; second, the number of workers who
needed re-employment should be reduced as much as possible. The
new companies were to make use of this surplus labor force by
expanding related business;
Eventually the passenger companies would have 200,000
employees;
(d) The freight company and Railway Technology Research Institute
would hire 15,000 employees.
The commission estimated that JNR's work force would be
276,000 at the time of the reform through regular retirement. In
addition, it proposed that JNR should have voluntary retirement of
20,000 employees before the reform; then there would be 41,000
who had to seek for new jobs. Those ex-JNR employees were to
belong to the JNRSC for three years to seek for jobs; the corporation
was supposed to find them jobs and educate them with new skills.
After three years the remaining employees were to be laid off.
The commission required that the government should take strong
countermeasures for the re-employment of JNR's voluntary retirees
and ex-JNR workers. It called for the understanding and cooperation
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of the companies which serve JNR, public sectors, and private
companies in employing JNR workers.
1.7.4 Disposition of JNR's Long-term Liabilities
The JNR Reform commission proposed that part of JNR's long-term
liabilities would be taken over by the new companies and the
Shinkansen Holding Corporation so that taxpayer's expense for
repaying JNR's long-term liabilities would be minimum, while each
company would make minimal profits under efficient operation as
other existing private railroads.
In addition to the long-term debt, JNR had commitments for
pension expenses and infrastructure leasing fees. Some expenses
were also considered necessary to accomplish the JNR Reform. The
commission proposed how to dispose of these liabilities (hereafter
referred to as "the JNR liabilities"), which was estimated to be 37.2
trillion yen on March 31, 1987.
The estimated breakdown of the JNR liabilities on March 31, 1987
is as follows:
(1) 25.4 trillion yen: JNR's long-term debt;
(2) 4.9 trillion yen: Part of the pension expenses for JNR employees
(The JR Companies were expected to pay the rest);
(3) 4.6 trillion yen: JNR's commitment to the Railway Construction
Corporation as leasing fees for facilities which the corporation built
for JNR;
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(4) 0.6 trillion: JNR's commitment for the bridge between Honshu
and Shikoku built by the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority;
(5) 0.9 trillion: Expense for the Management Stabilization Fund,
which will be described later in this section);
(6) 0.9 trillion: Expense of measures for surplus workers in JNRSC.
The "Opinions" proposal described the disposal plan of the JNR
liabilities as follows (Figure 1-10 shows the detail of the disposition
with actual amounts):
(1) JR East, Central, West, and Freight would take over 5.9 trillion
yen of long-term debt from JNR in total. In addition, JR East, Central,
West, operating the Shinkansen lines, would pay the Shinkansen
leasing fees, whose total amount was 8.5 trillion yen, to the
Shinkansen Holding Corporation over thirty years. The leasing fee
would be distributed to each company based upon the traffic of the
Shinkansen line which belonged to the company and revised every
two yearss;
(2) The Three Island Companies would not take over any of the JNR
liability. They would be given a one-time subsidy, or the
Management Stabilization Fund, to make up for their operating losses
with the interest of the fund;
5 This rule was determined after the "Opinions" proposal by a relevant law, but
the author of the thesis has written it there for simplification.
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(3) The Shinkansen Holding Corporation would take over 5.7 trillion
yen of long-term debt from JNR, and also owe the JNRSC 2.8 trillion
yen in total. The corporation' total liabilities would be equal to the
total leasing fees, which JR East, Central, and West would pay over
thirty years. After that, the Shinkansen infrastructure would be sold
to the three companies;
(4) The remaining 23.1 trillion yen of the JNR liabilities would be
disposed of by JNRSC. JNR had vast unused land, mainly generated
from the abolishment of freight facilities. The corporation would sell
the land and the JR Companies' stocks to pay for the liabilities. The
national government should pay for the rest of the JNR liabilities.
The JR Companies and the Shinkansen Holding Corporation were
expected to be responsible for 14.2 trillion yen in total, about 40
percent of the JNR liabilities, which were estimated to be 37.3 trillion
yen.
The disposition of the JNR liability was decided upon either the
book values or current prices of the assets which relevant
organizations were expected to take over. (The detail is out of the
scope of the thesis.) The "Opinions" proposal demonstrated that this
disposition plan would duly have each company make a minimal
profit, as the thesis describes in Section 1.7.5.
1.7.5 Forecast of the JR Companies' Financial Conditions
The JNR Reform Commission forecasted passenger revenue,
personnel expenses, capital investment corresponding to the
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replacement of old assets, material cost based on that of private
railroads, and other expenses. Combining these costs with the long-
term debt distribution plan, the Management Stabilization Fund plan,
and the estimate of the Shinkansen leasing fee, the commission
showed that the six passenger companies would make minimal
profits in FY1987, as shown in Table 1-4.
The "Opinions" proposal left the outline of the freight company to
further investigation by the government. In December 1985, the
Ministry of Transport issued "the Outline of the Freight Company,"
which included the forecast of traffic, revenue, and expense of the
freight company. The ministry also referred to the estimate of the
freight company's labor force and proposed the agreements, such as
trackage rights fee, which the freight company should have with the
passenger companies.
1.7.6 Capital Investment in New Lines
The commission emphasized the initiative of the new companies
in the decisions to invest in new lines. The "Opinions" proposal
stated this as follows:
"Future construction of new lines should be decided by the
passenger companies' management, as in private railroads.
Adequate countermeasures like the existing systems in the
construction of private railroads' lines should be taken if necessary."
The government subsidized part of private railroads'
infrastructure costs, as the thesis will review in Section 2.5.2.
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Table 1-4 JNR Reform Commission's Prediction of
Financial Conditions of the JR-Companies in FY1987
unit: billion yen
Note 1: JR-Hokkaido would receive special subsidy for its ferry line only in
FY1987.
Note2: Shinkansen Leasing Fee is part of the material expenses.
Source: Kokutetsu Saiken Kanri Iinkai, 1985
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Hokkaido East Central West Shikoku Kyushu Total
Income and Revenue
Operating Revenues 86.8 1,384.9 779.5 705.3 30.8 108.1 3,095.4
Operating Expenses
Personnel Expenses 76.3 447.9 132.4 275.5 25.2 79.9 1,037.2
Material Expenses 35.2 506.5 545.0 277.2 11.5 35.3 1,410.7
[of which Leasing Fee] N.A. [197.9] [405.6] [103.2] N.A. N.A. [706.7]
Other Expenses 15.5 209.7 56.3 81.0 6.0 18.5 387.0
Total 127.0 1,164.1 733.7 633.7 42.7 133.7 2,834.9
Operating Profits -40.2 220.8 45.8 71.6 -11.9 -25.6 260.5
Interest Income 36.6 N.A. N.A. N.A. 12.2 14.4 75.5
Interest Expense N.A. 207.0 38.0 64.5 N.A. N.A. 309.5
Ordinary Income -3.6 13.8 7.8 7.1 0.3 1.1 26.5
Net Profit 0.9 13.8 7.8 7.1 0.3 1.1 31.0
Liability and Assets
Assets (04/01/87) 270.0 3,310.0 560.0 1,370.0 90.0 310.0 5,910.0
Stabilization Fund 490.0 N.A. N.A. N.A. 170.0 360.0 1,020.0
Liability (04/01/87) N.A. 2,870.0 350.0 1,130.0 N.A. N.A. 4,350.0
Capital (04/01/87) 14.9 275.0 155.6 140.1 5.6 21.3 612.5
"Regional residents strongly yearn for the construction of Seibi
Shinkansen (see Section 2.4.1) as a mode of high-speed
transportation in the 21st century; however, the present plan
necessitates huge investment and would have serious influences on
the new companies' financial conditions. Hence, the following issues
should be considered to make a deliberate decision:
(1) Balance between forecasted demand and the amount of
investment;
(2) Influence upon the financial condition of the conventional lines
whose express passengers would move to the Shinkansen;
(3) Funding;
(4) Possibility for cost reduction by technical development."
1.8 How Was the JNR Reform Accomplished?
1.8.1 Passage of the JNR Reform Act
After the final proposal of the JNR Reform was submitted in 1985,
some of JNR's labor unions, the Socialist Party, and the Communist
Party were opposed to the reform. However, in 1986 the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), at the time the ruling conservative party,
overwhelmingly won the elections of both the Lower and Upper
Houses. Hence, the bill of the JNR Reform passed on November 28,
1986 without serious opposition. As the JNR Reform was a major
issue in the election, this result indicated public support for the
reform. Other bills related to the reform were passed one after
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another. The Railway Construction Act, which designated the lines to
be built, was also abolished. The act, which was enacted in 1922, had
been repeatedly criticized that it was the basis for building rural
lines, which was a cause of JNR's financial crisis 6.
1.8.2 JNR's Prediction of Financial Conditions of the JR
Companies
Based on updated traffic data and more detailed information, JNR
developed a revised forecast of the passenger and freight companies'
five-year financial condition. Table 1-5 shows the forecast of the
total passenger traffic. Table 1-6 shows the forecast of passenger
and freight traffic and revenue in each company. JNR assumed an
annual increase of revenue per passenger-km and ton-km. That
increase in the passenger companies was expected to be done by
annual fare increases (Table 1-10). As for the freight company, the
relative growth of intermodal traffic, which had higher fares, to bulk
freight was expected to push up average revenue rates. Table 1-7
shows the predicted capital investments of the companies.
As shown in Table 1-8, JNR predicted the profitability of the JR
Companies in FY1987. As JNR forecasted less revenue and more
expenses for the Three Island Companies than the JNR Reform
Commission did, the Management Stabilization Fund was increased.
Table 1-9 shows a five-year-long forecast of the revenue and income
of the JR Companies, which the "Opinions" proposal did not provide.
6 For example, see Matsuura,1971, pp.79-105.
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Table 1-5 JNR's Prediction of Traffic Volume
ACTUAL FORECAST
FY1985 FY1990
Share(%) Share(%)
Automobiles 489,300 57 543,200 58.9
Air 33,100 3.9 43,000 4.7
Ships 5,700 0.7 5,400 0.6
Railroads
Shinkansen 55,400 6.5 54,900 6
Other ex-JNR 142,100 16.5 142,800 15.1
Total ex-JNR 197,500 23 197,700 21.1
Private R.R. 132,600 15.5 135,300 14.7
Total R.R. 330,100 38.5 330,000 35.8
Total Traffic 858,200 100 921,600 100
unit of traffic: million passernger-km
Source: Nomiya, 1986
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Table 1-6 Predicted Traffic and RR Revenue of the JR-Companies
FY Hokkaido East Central West Shikoku Kyushu Subtotal Freight Total
1985 Traffic 3.80 99.12 39.45 45.59 1.59 7.26 196.81 68.55
RR Revenue 60.5 1,261.0 768.0 659.3 22.8 97.5 2,869.1 179.2 3,048.3
1987 Traffic 3.61 99.41 38.50 45.42 1.52 6.94 195.40 57.77
RR Revenue 60.6 1,317.5 784.8 684.5 22.8 97.5 2,967.7 159.2 3,126.9
1988 Traffic 3.76 99.28 38.34 45.39 1.63 6.76 195.16 54.34
RR Revenue 66.8 1,344.9 803.6 707.6 26.1 100.0 3,049.0 165.9 3,214.9
1989 Traffic 3.63 99.69 38.24 45.38 1.58 6.59 195.11 51.70
RRRevenue 68.7 1,408.4 824.3 731.8 26.7 102.8 3,162.7 167.8 3,330.5
1990 Traffic 3.52 99.74 38.16 45.37 1.53 6.43 194.42 51.78
RR Revenue 70.6 1,438.4 846.4 758.0 27.4 105.8 3,246.6 172.2 3,418.8
1991 Traffic 3.40 99.58 38.06 45.36 1.48 6.27 194.15 52.09
RRRevenue 72.6 1,458.1 858.6 784.6 28.1 108.8 3,310.8 177.3 3,488.1
Note 1: Actual Data in FY1985
The unit of railroad revenue is billion yen.
As for passenger, the unit of traffic is million passeger-km.
As for freight, the unit of traffic is millin ton-km.
Source: Nomiya, 1986; Tamura,1986
Table 1-7 Predicted Investment of the JR-Companies
FY Hokkaido East Central West Shikoku Kyushu Subtotal Freight Total
1987 14.2 152.3 96.2 79.9 6.3 17.8 366.7 5.4 372.1
1988 13.0 146.0 97.7 85.1 4.8 18.3 364.9 7.6 372.5
1989 14.3 146.3 92.4 103.6 6.1 19.7 382.4 8.8 391.2
1990 14.8 131.1 88.1 125.7 5.7 19.0 384.4 11.9 486.9
1991 13.7 122.8 82.9 104.7 8.6 20.4 353.1 14.0 515.9
unit: billion yen
Source: Nomiya, 1986; Tamura, 1986
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Note
Note
Note
Table 1-8 JNR's Prediction of
Financial Conditions of the JR-Companies in FY1987
Hokkaide East Tokai West Shikoku Kyushu Subtotal Freight Total
Income and Revenues
Operating Revenues 83.1 1,438.3 803.9 742.8 30.0 110.9 3,209.0 161.4 3,370.4
Operating Expenses
Personnel Expenses 71.1 464.2 136.4 280.4 24.4 75.9 1,052.4 67.2 1,119.6
Material Expenses 44.4 523.9 591.9 288.6 13.5 41.8 1,504.1 68.7 1,572.8
[Leasing Fees] N.A. [200.5] [418.41 [93.5] N.A. N.A. [712.4] N.A. [712.4]
Other Expenses 14.6 208.9 42.4 85.5 6.2 20.2 377.8 12.4 390.2
Total 130.1 1,197.0 770.7 654.5 44.1 137.9 2,934.3 148.3 3,082.6
Operating Profits -47.0 241.3 33.2 88.3 -14.1 -27.0 274.7 13.1 287.8
Interest Income 46.6 N.A. N.A. N.A. 14.4 28.1 89.1 N.A. 89.1
Interest Expense N.A. 226.9 25.1 80.8 N.A. N.A. 332.8 11.5 344.3
Ordinary Income -0.4 14.4 8.1 7.5 0.3 1.1 31.0 1.6 32.6
Net Profit 0.8 14.4 8.1 7.5 0.3 1.1 32.2 1.6 33.8
Liability and Assets
Assets(04/01/87) 261.0 3,636.0 542.0 1,407.0 98.0 341.0 6,285.0 2.2 6,287.2
Stabilization Fund 620.0 N.A. N.A. N.A. 192.0 372.0 1,184.0 N.A. 1,184.0
Liability (04/01/87) N.A. 3,160.0 320.0 1,140.0 N.A. N.A. 4,610.0 1.6 4,611.6
Capital (04/01/87) 14.6 287.7 160.8 148.6 5.5 22.2 639.4 0.3 639.7
Employees(04/01/87 13,000 89,600 25,200 53,400 4,900 15,000 201,100 12,500 213,600
unit: billion yen
Note 1: JR-Hokkaido would receive special subsidy for its ferry line only in
FY 1987.
Note 2: Leasing Fee is part of the material expenses.
Source: Nomiya 1986, Tamura 1986
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Table 1-9 Predicted Financial Conditions of the JR-Companies
FY Hokkaido East Central West Shikoku Kyushu Subtotal Freight Total
Operating Revenue. 86.8 1,565.7 874.6 763.1 35.2 129.8 3,209.0 161.4 3,370.4
1987 Operating Expenses 145.7 1,269.2 803.1 692.3 50.1 158.7 2,934.3 148.3 3,082.6
Ordinary Income -2.2 76.6 60.7 8.0 1.0 1.5 32.2 1.6 33.8
Operating Revenues 94.0 1.663.5 968.5 807.1 43.7 139.6 3,306.8 168.2 3,475.0
1988 Operating Expenses 147.3 1.340.3 866.2 727.7 54.6 168.1 3,007.3 155.5 3,162.8
Ordinary Income -1.2 85.6 94.9 17.2 5.7 3.0 60.9 2.0 62.9
Operating Revenues 99.8 1,735.5 1,003.1 834.3 43.9 143.9 3,449.9 170.1 3,620.0
1989 Operating Expenses 152.5 1,454.4 889.4 743.3 55.5 172.7 3,141.2 158.2 3,299.4
Ordinary Income 0.2 103.4 108.3 40.2 6.1 3.8 71.6 1.8 73.4
Operating Revenues 105.0 1,851.6 1,101.3 892.3 48.0 150.7 3,565.8 174.6 3,740.4
1990 Operating Expenses 154.1 1,559.4 889.4 743.3 56.7 179.4 3,259.8 162.5 3,422.3
Ordinary Income 1.6 149.6 108.3 40.2 8.4 3.9 75.0 1.9 76.9
Operating Revenues 106.3 1,949.9 1,130.7 917.2 51.0 160.4 3,655.5 179.8 3,835.3
1991 Operating Expenses 154.6 1,595.1 843.0 789.4 60.1 188.6 3,335.1 166.9 3,502.0
Ordinary Income 2.0 108.0 117.0 66.1 7.1 4.2 92.6 3.3 95.9
unit: billion yen
Source: Nomiya 1986, Tamura 1986
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Average Annual Increase of Fare
Companies Annual Growth of Revenue per
Passenger-km (percent)
JR-Hokkaido 6
JR-East 3
JR-Central 3
JR-West 4
JR-Shikoku 6
JR-Kyushu 5
Source: Nomiya, 1986
Table 1-11 Comparison of Revenue and Cost
unit: billion yen
JNR (FY1985) New Companies
Predicted by
JNR (FY1987)
Operating Revenues 3,310.5 3,370.4
Operating Expenses
Leasing Fee N.A. 712.4
Operating Expenses without 4,352.9 2,370.2
Leasing Fee
[of which Personnel Expenses] [2,302.4] [1,109.6]
Total Operating Expenses 4,352.9 3,082.6
Note : Some of the personnel cost of JNR was not included in the item
of "personnel expenses" due to JNR's accounting rule. For example,
cost for employees engaged in car repair was included in "material
expenses."
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RateTable 1-10
Table 1-11 shows how the new companies would cut expenses to
make profits. Although some of JNR's personnel expenses were
classified in other expenses due to JNR's accounting rule, it was true
that the personnel expenses would be less than one half. Material
expenses were also expected to be reduced7.
1.8.3 Transition
JNR's major labor unions had been strongly opposed to the
Reform. In 1986, however, its unions reorganized themselves into
smaller opposing unions and cooperative majority unions (the reason
is described in Section 3.6.1). This reorganization eased streamlining
labor force, morale reform, and the countermeasures for surplus
workers.
It was announced that the new companies would select the JNR
workers they would employ on the basis of JNR's evaluation (Saiyou
no Kijun, 1987). This, combined with the reorganization of labor
unions, improved the JNR workers' morale quickly.
As a countermeasure for the surplus labor force, many workers
moved from Hokkaido and Kyushu, which had a large surplus labor
force, to Tokyo and Osaka, which had less. Most of them were
members of cooperative unions. The unions encouraged the workers
to leave their home regions.
7 JR-Hokkaido's effort to implement such a slashed material expense was
reported in Koike, 1992
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JNR accomplished efficient operations which would be the
prototype for the new companies. For instance, JNR had already
revised the labor agreement so that drivers would work as long as
the standard labor hours set by the labor agreement, while actual
work hours had been below the standard labor hours (Section 1.2).
Since JNR revised train schedule in November 1986, a freight train
was operated by only one person.
The employees applied to the companies, for which they wanted
to work. The companies, whose establishment committees started in
December 1986, selected the workers they would employ based on
JNR's personnel evaluation. Fortunately, the number of voluntary
retirees amounted to 39,090, far more than the JNR Reform
Commission expected. As many as 20,845 employees were accepted
to governments, other public sectors, and private companies.
Therefore, the companies, with the exception of JR Hokkaido and
Kyushu, accepted almost all applicants In the end, only 7,628
employees needed re-employment in JNRSC. On March 31, 1987, the
81-year-old history of the national railroad ended, leaving liabilities
of 25.6 trillion yen.
In the next chapter, several events which took place after the
reform are reviewed. In Chapter 3, JNR and the JR Companies are
compared in various aspects to evaluate the overall impacts of the
privatization and division of JNR. In Chapter 4, lessons of the JNR
Reform are discussed. In Chapter 5, suggestions for other railroads
thinking about privatization and the JR Companies are stated.
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2. What Has Happened since the JNR Reform?
In this chapter, the author describes major events after the JNR
Reform and describes the following:
(1) Key issues of the implementation of the JNR Reform after April
1, 1987 are discussed in Sections 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.10;
(2) The reorganized relationship between the government and the
railroad are reviewed in Sections 2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9, especially
focusing on current plans and construction of new railroads;
(3) A problem accompanying the division of JNR is described in
Section 2.6.
2.1 Performance of the JR Companies
2.1.1 Traffic and Service Level
During JNR's final years, passenger traffic was stagnant, and
freight traffic was decreasing; since the reform both have increased.
Figures 2-1 and 2-2 show changes in passenger and freight traffic
volume, respectively. The average annual growth of the passenger-
km was 0.6 percent in FY1982-1986 and 4.5 percent in FY1987-
1991. In FY1988, passenger traffic exceeded the highest level
achieved by JNR8. Freight volume declined by 9.5 percent annually
8 The maximum annual passenger traffic was 215.6 billion passenger-km in
FY1974 (Ministry of Transport, Kokutetsu Kaikaku Go 5 Nenkan no Seika to
Kadai, 1992).
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Figure 2-1 Change of Passenger Traffic
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Figure 2-2 Change of Freight Traffic
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in FY1982-19869, but increased by 6.1 percent annually in FY1987-
1991.
Since the reform, the service has improved significantly in train
frequency, the quality of cars, cleanliness, etc., as this thesis will
describe in more detail in Section 3.4.
2.1.2 Financial Performance
Total and individual financial results of the JR Companies are
shown in Tables 2-1 and 2-2, respectively. The total ordinary
income of the seven JR Companies has been stable, above 200 billion
yen, every year since FY1988.
Table 2-2 shows that all the companies except JR Hokkaido have
been making profit in ordinary income since the reform; JR Hokkaido
has been profitable since FY1989. Until FY1990, the ordinary
incomes of the companies had been increasing year by yearo0 .
Table 2-3 shows that the JR Companies have reduced the long-
term debt which they inherited. It fell from 4.7 trillion yen on April
1, 1987, to 3.4 trillion yen on March 31, 1991. The significant
decline in the JR Companies' long-term debt demonstrates that the
companies have improved their financial condition since the
privatization.
9 Note that JNR abolished many inefficient freight services during this period.
10 The only exception was that the JR Freight reduced ordinary income in
FY1989.
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Table 2-1 Financial Conditions of the JR-Companies
Note 1: These figures show the sum of the JR-Companies'
statements.
Note 2: The figures in parentheses show the growth of the previous year (in
percentage).
Souce: Ministry of Transport, Kokutetsu Kaikaku Go 5 Nenkan no Seika to
Kadai, 1992
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Items FY1987 FY1988 FY1989 FY1990 FY1991 FY1992 Ave.
(in billion Yen) Annual
Growth
Operating Revenues 3,633.0 3,899.2 4,052.6 4,353.8 4,530.7 4,554.1
(--) (7.3) (3.9) (7.4) (4.1) (0.5) (4.6)
Operating Expenses 3,280.6 3,476.3 3,650.0 3,881.1 3,839.3 3,646.0
(--) (6.0) (5.0) (6.3) (-1.1) (-5.0) (2.2)
Operating Profits 352.3 422.8 402.5 472.7 691.4 908.1
(--) (20.0) (-4.8) (17.4) (46.3) (31.3) (22.0)
Ordinary Income 151.5 211.8 268.4 387.6 306.3 233.3
(--) (39.8) (26.7) (44.4) (-21.0) (-23.8) (13.2)
Profit after Taxes 50.0 88.9 160.1 148.0 156.5 130.3
(--) (77.8) (80.1) (-7.6) (5.7) (-16.7) (27.9)
income
Table 2-2 Financial Conditions of the Individual JR-
Companies
FY Hokkaido East Central West Shikoku Kyushu Subtotal Freight Total
Operating Revenues 86.8 1,565.7 874.6 763.1 35.2 129.8 3,460.3 172.7 3,633.0
1987 Operating Expenses 145.7 1,269.2 803.1 692.3 50.1 158.7 3,119.1 161.5 3,280.6
Ordinary Income (2.2) 76.6 60.7 8.0 1.0 1.5 145.6 5.9 151.5
Operating Revenues 94.0 1.663.5 968.5 807.1 43.7 139.6 3,716.5 182.7 3,899.2
1988 Operating Expenses 147.3 1.340.3 866.2 727.7 54.6 168.1 3,304.2 172.1 3,476.3
Ordinary Income (1.2) 85.6 94.9 17.2 5.7 3.0 205.2 6.6 211.8
Operating Revenues 99.8 1,735.5 1,003.1 834.3 43.9 143.9 3,860.5 192.1 4,052.6
1989 Operating Expenses 152.5 1,454.4 889.4 743.3 55.5 172.7 2,867.8 182.2 3,050.0
Ordinary Income 0.2 103.4 108.3 40.2 6.1 3.8 262.0 6.4 268.4
Operating Revenues 105.0 1,851.6 1,101.3 892.3 48.0 150.7 4,148.9 204.9 4,353.8
1990 Operating Expenses 154.1 1,559.4 889.4 743.3 56.7 179.4 3,687.5 193.6 3,881.1
Ordinary Income 1.6 149.6 108.3 40.2 8.4 3.9 385.7 1.9 387.6
Operating Revenues 106.3 1,949.9 1,130.7 917.2 51.0 160.4 4,315.5 215.2 4,530.7
1991 Operating Expenses 154.6 1,595.1 843.0 789.4 60.1 188.6 3,630.8 208.5 3,839.3
Ordinary Income 2.0 108.0 117.0 66.1 7.1 4.2 304.4 1.9 306.3
Operating Revenues 105.4 1,908.8 1,110.5 922.5 51.2 167.2 4,338.0 216.1 4,554.1
1992 Operating Expenses 152.3 1,542.0 705.8 778.2 62.3 194.7 3,435.5 210.5 3,646.0
Ordinary Income 1.3 100.9 67.6 55.7 3.8 3.5 233.1 0.2 233.3
unit: billion yen
Source: Ministry of Transport, Kokutetsu Kaikaku Go 5 Nenkan no Seika to
Kadai, 1992
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Table 2-3 Change of the Long-Term Liability of JNR
04/01/87 04/02/88 04/01/89 04/01/90 04/01/91 04/01/92
Sum 37.1 37.3 37.5 38 37 37.1
JR's Own Long-term Liability 4.7 4.4 3.9 3,7 3.5 3.4
JR's Liability for Railway
Construction Corp. 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
Shinkansen Holding Corp. 5.7 5.6 5.5 6.2 6.2 6.1
JNR Settlement Corp. 25.5 26.1 26.9 27.1 26.2 26.4
unit: trillion yen
Note: 1) The Shinkansen Holding Corporation was reorganized to the
Railway Development Fund as of October 1, 1991.
2) Besides this table, the JR-Companies owe liability of 9.1 trillion yen to
the Railway Construction Fund as of April 1, 1992 for Shinkansen's
infrastructure.
3) "JNR's Liability" includes both JNR's own liability and other
organizations' liability for which JNR was responsible, such as the
construction expense of the Japan Railway Construction Corporation and the
pension for JNR employees.
Source: The Ministry of Transport, Kokutetsu Kaikaku Go 5 Nenkan no
Seika to Kadai, 1992
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These figures show that the JR Companies have been performing
well financially. The companies' performance has been better than
expected. For example, the total ordinary income was forecast to be
94.3 billion yen in FY1990 by the government; actually it was 387.6
billion.
The good financial performance of the JR Companies is accounted
for by increased traffic, increased productivity, and abated long-term
debt, as discussed in Section 3.2.
2.2 Re-employment Of Surplus Workers
Figure 2-3 shows the re-employment of surplus workers. The
number of JNR employees who retired was far more than expected;
45,390 workers retired during FY1986; 7,320 workers went to other
public sectors; 13,525 went to JNRSC to wait for later employment
which was promised to them; 7,628 workers moved to JNRSC to seek
new jobs. During the three years which were allowed the ex-JNR
workers to find employment, 6,581 got new jobs. About 2,300 of
those employees were employed by JR East, Central, and West, which
had fewer employees than planned. Finally, 1,047 workers were
dismissed on March 31, 1990 (Ministry of Transport, Kokutetsu
Kaikaku Go 5 Nenkan no Seika to Kadai, 1992).
The Ministry of Transport asserts that the dismissed workers
were themselves responsible for their unemployment, since they
were not interested in the jobs which JNRSC listed. The ministry
asserted that the dismissed workers insisted on re-employment by
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Figure 2-3
JNR Employees: 277,020 -
As of April 1. 1986
Re-Employment of ex-JNR Workers
JR-Comoanies
200,650 as of April 1, 1987
Voluntary Retirement
39,090
- Retirement until Public Sectors
March 31,1987: 52,710 7,320
Others: 6,300
JNR Settlement Corporation
23,660 as of April 1, 1987
K g ninruteR Long-term Debt: 2,507
Guaranteed Employment Elsewhere
F 
13,525
-Without Job:
Re-employed by
March 31, 1990: 6,581
(including by
the JR-Companies)
7,628
Dismissed as of
March 31, 1990: 1,047
Source: Ministry of Transport, Kokutetsu Kaikaku Go 5 Nenkan no
Seika to Kadai, 1992
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JR Hokkaido and Kyushu, which had no room for extra workers
(Kurono, 1993).
2.3 Failure of the Long-Term Liabilities Return Plan
After 1987, Japan's economy recovered and overheated. It was
the time of the so-called "bubble economy," when land was the object
of speculation. The government had JNRSC suspend selling the land
so that the speculation of land would not be stimulated. Hence, the
plan for paying JNRSC's share of JNR's long-term liabilities, which
amounted to 23 trillion yen (Figure 1-10), failed.
After the end of the bubble economy, the government unfroze the
selling of JNRSC land in FY1992, but by then the demand for land had
fallen due to the recession. Annual revenue from the land now just
covers the annual interest payment of JNRSC (Nishimura, 1993).
Other sources for paying JNRSC's liabilities were the stock of the
JR Companies. However, due to the declining stock market, the
public offering of the stock was suspended until October 1993.
Hence, the national budget will have to cover most of JNRSC's
liabilities. Budgetary countermeasures for the liabilities remain a
future problem.
2.4 New Shinkansen 11
The JNR Reform has brought about the drastic change of national
railroad policies. The most significant example was the extension of
11 See Seibi Shinansen 15 Nen Buri no Chakkou, 1989
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Shinkansen, which has been disputed for nearly three decades as a
political issue. Two key issues are observed in the resolution of the
problem after the reform. First, the financial viability of the JR
Companies has been prioritized by the government. Second, the
government began to take a leadership in public railroad investment
policies as well in other transportation modes; such leadership was
never seen in the JNR era.
2.4.1 Nationwide Shinkansen Construction Plan
Due to the enthusiastic public reception of the Tokaido
Shinkansen, JNR's first Shinkansen connecting Tokyo and Osaka,
which was completed in 1964, there had been strong demand for
additional Shinkansen lines. In 1970, "Zenkoku Shinkansen Tetsudou
Seibi Hou" (the Shinkansen Construction Act), the master plan for a
nationwide Shinkansen network (Figure 2-4), was passed.
The nationwide Shinkansen network was also part of Japan's
national economic development policy 12, which was aimed at
correcting excessive concentration in huge metropolitan areas.
In addition to the lines which were already operated or being
built 13, the construction of five new Shinkansen lines called Seibi
Shinkansen (Figure 2-4) was decided in 1973. However, due to
inflation after the oil crisis of that year, the construction of Seibi
Shinkansen was suspended. The government was discouraged at the
12 The master plans of Japan's national development policy have been revised
three times: "Zen-Sou" (1962), "Shin Zen-Sou" (1969), "San Zen-Sou" (1978),
"Yon Zen-Sou" (1986)
13 Those lines form current Shinkansen lines.
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Figure 2-4 Nationwide Shinkansen Network
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Source: Mitsubishi Sougou Kenkyuujo Jigyou Senryaku
Kenkyuushitsu, 1987, p. 2
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Tokaido Shinkansen
__
high cost of construction; it considered deleting the construction of
Seibi Shinkansen from the national economic development policy, but
eventually could not, due to strong political pressure (Homma, 1978,
pp.166-167).
In September 1982, the cabinet decided to freeze the construction
of Seibi Shinkansen, since the JNR Reform Commission had proposed
to do so in the previous month as an urgent countermeasure to help
restructure JNR. The JNR Reform Commission requested that
construction should not affect the JR Companies' financial condition
(Section 1.7.6).
In January 1987, the cabinet decided to resume construction of
Seibi Shinkansen. However, funding was a problem. The
construction cost was estimated to be five trillion yen. The Ministry
of Finance did not agree to use funds from the national budget for
the construction because of huge governmental debt.
2.4.2 Authorization of "Seibi Shinkansen" Construction
In August 1988, the Ministry of Transport proposed its own plan
to build Seibi Shinkansen much more cheaplyl 4. The so-called "basic
scheme" plan is to build three of the five Seibi Shinkansen lines and
to build the Shinkansen right-of way in some parts (The differences
between Shinkansen and conventional lines are shown in Table 2-4.)
and use the right-of-way of conventional lines elsewhere (Figure 2-
5). The plan is shown in Figure 2-6. Total expenditure was
14 See Takiguchi and Kawai, 1988; Miura, 1989, pp.171-174
Table 2-4 Comparison of Shinkansen and
Conventional Lines
Items Shinkansen J Conventional Lines
Gauge 1435mm 1067mm
(Standard Gauge) (Narrow Gauge)
Maximum Speed 275km/h 130km/h*
Maximum Width of 3380mm about 2900mm
Car Bodies
Maximum Length of 24500mm 20800mm
Car Bodies
Minimum Radius of 2500m (Tokaido) 800m*
Curves in Main Track 4000m (Other Lines)
Grade Crossings Do not exist Exist
Figure 2-5 Alternative Plans of Shinkansen
"Mini Shinkansen" "Super Limited Express"
Standard-gauged tracks replace Narrow-gauged tracks are laid in
narrow-gauged tracks in the right- the new right-of-way which is built
of-way of existing conventional under the Shinkansen standards for
lines***. The cars have the same potential future use as Shinkansen
body as conventional lines with tracks. The cars are those of
wheels for the standard gauge. The conventional lines, allowing the
maximum speed is 130km/h or so. maximum speed 160-200km/h.
(Shinkansen-Sized R.O.W.) Shinkansen Right-of-way
Conventional Line R.O.W.
Conventional Express Trains
"Mini Shinkansen" Cars- Narrow-Gauged Tracks--
Standard-Gauged Tracks
Source: Ministry of Transport, Un'yu Hakusho Heisei 4 Nen Ban, 1992,
p. 159
I ne speec or 14U Kr n/ is perrmtted in Seikan Undersea Tunnel as
an exception.
** This standard is applied in "Class 1 lines", which are the most
important lines; conventional lines are classified into Class 1 to 4.
This standard is applied for new lines only.
** The new tracks may have three or four rails to pass both narrow-
gauged and standard-gauged trains.
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Source: Ministry of Transport, Un'vu Hakusho Heisei 4 Nen Ban, 1992,
p. 159
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Figure 2-6
'-- -
estimated to be 1,380 billion yen, much cheaper than the original
plan, which was expected to cost 2,920 trillion to build the three
lines, although the train speed is slower than in the original plan.
In January 1989, it was agreed that the JR Companies would bear
50 percent, and that the national and local governments would pay
the other 50 percent of the construction cost. To retain the financial
viability of the JR Companies which operate those Shinkansen lines,
the Shinkansen leasing system was modified. (This issue is outside
the scope of the thesiss5 .) In June 1989, the national government's
funding was authorized by a law (Takeda, 1989). The construction
began in the same year.
When the ministry announced the "basic scheme" in 1988, it was
agreed that the Seibi Shinkansen plan would be discussed again for
potential revision five years later. Five years have passed, and local
people who are not satisfied with the "basic scheme" strongly request
the construction of Seibi Shinkansen as originally planned.
It should be noted that the financial viability of the JR Companies
has been repeatedly emphasized throughout the discussion of Seibi
Shinkansen (Seibi Shinkansen Kensetsuhi ni Hatsu no Zatiou, 1993)
15 See Miura, 1989, pp.175-179; Takeda, 1989; Seibi Shinansen 15 Nen Buri no
Chakkou, 1989; Mitani,1993
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2.5 Public Subsidy for Infrastructure
2.5.1 Financial Relations between JNR and the
Government
The JNR budget was one of the separate accounts1 6 of the national
budget. JNR could plan deficit financing and accumulate the debt
only if the government and the Diet approved its budget plan. To get
the approval, however, JNR needed the help of politicians, making
JNR susceptible to political intervention.
The national subsidies for JNR, which meant the financial help
from the general account to the JNR special account, had existed
when JNR was profitable to aid construction of new lines. After JNR
began to run a deficit, the government subsidized part of the interest
expenses, part of the loss from rural lines, and other losses (Section
3.2.1). In FY1985, the JNR special account received 600.1 billion yen
as subsidies, of which 150.4 billion was for its infrastructure (Nihon
Kokuyu Tetsudou Kansa Iinkai, 1986).
2.5.2 Existing Public Aid for Railroad Construction by
the Private Railroads
Existing private railroads provide important services in
metropolitan areas. There have been many systems of subsidies for
constructing infrastructure 17 by private railroads18, includingl 9:
16 Other separated accounts include the national forestry account and the Food
Stuff (rice) Control Special Account.
17 There are also subsidies for operating losses, but that system is applied to
only rural railroads.
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(1) Subsidy of two-thirds of the total cost of subway construction;
(2) Subsidy of a portion of the interest expense generated by
construction of new lines;
(3) Subsidy of a portion of the construction cost of new lines built
to "New Towns," or satellite cities;
(4) Provision of low-interest loans (5-6 percent a year) which
cover part of the cost (30-50 percent) of improving safety, raising
capacity, and upgrading service (air-conditioning in trains, for
example) by the Japan Development Bank.
In addition, several private railroads were permitted to raise
fares before they finish building new tracks. The extra revenue is
reserved for amortization.
2.5.3 Subsidy for the JR Companies' Infrastructure
As JR East, Central, and West performed well financially, the
listing of the stock of these companies was just around the corner.
However, the prices of the Shinkansen infrastructure, which the
three companies were expected to buy from the Shinkansen Holding
Corporation when the lease terminated in 2017 (Section 1.7.4), had
not been decided. This uncertainty in the future financial condition
18 In this section, the author includes local governments' rapid transit in
private railroads. Local governments' railroads are legally treated as private
railroads.
19 For complete explanations, see the Ministry of Transport, Suuii de Miru
Tetsudou 1992, 1992, pp.126-131; the Ministry of Transport, 21 Seiki ni ..., 1992,
pp.110-117
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of the three companies was a problem in evaluating if their stock
was eligible for listing. Hence, they wanted to own the infrastructure
of Shinkansen rather than pay the leasing fees to Shinkansen Holding
Corporation until 2017.
On October 1, 1991, the Shinkansen Holding Corporation sold the
infrastructure to JR East, Central, and West for 9.2 trillion yen, and
was reorganized into the Railway Development Fund. The price was
1.1 trillion yen higher than the total amount of the leasing
commitments which the three companies had owed to the
Shinkansen Holding Corporation. The three companies owe 9.2
trillion as liabilities to the fund and pay 8.1 trillion yen over 25.5
years and 1.1 trillion over 60 years. The 1.1 trillion is used as part
of the government's expense for Seibi Shinkansen, and the 8.1 trillion
is used for paying the fund's own debt and liabilities to JNRSC
(Tatezawa, 1992).
The fund has several functions; first, it collects the infrastructure
fees from JR East, Central, and West and pays the fees for paying its
long-term debt and to JNRSC. Second, it deals with several kinds of
public subsidies for railroad construction, including the construction
of Seibi Shinkansen, with the 1.1 trillion yen. Third, it deals with
some subsidies which already existed. The Ministry of Transport is
expanding public subsidies for railroad infrastructures, and the role
of the fund will therefore become more important.
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2.5.4 Public Aid by Local Governments
After the JNR Reform, the JR Companies had financial limitations
to fulfill local needs. Hence, local governments began to subsidize
railroads for speed-up and increasing capacity in two ways. First,
the local governments subsidize the railroads directly. Second,
quasi-public corporations are established to own the right-of-way
and tracks, and the local governments invest in and subsidize the
corporations20. Sometimes a railroad gives the right-of-way of a line
to such a quasi-public corporation which upgrades the line, and pay
the leasing fees to the corporation. Private companies along the lines
sometimes join the investors.
2.6 JR Companies' Reluctance in Capital Investment2 1
In 1989, the national government began to enforce the law that
enabled local governments to direct construction of railroads jointly
with land development for houses. The land for the right-of-way
becomes available through the readjustment of town lots which local
governments carry out. The New Joban Line, planned as a new
commuter line in Tokyo, was the system's application. A quasi-
public corporation, named "Shutoken Shin-Toshi Tetsudo Co. Ltd."
was established by local governments to build the line.
20 For detail, see Un'yu Chousa Kyoku, undated
21 Miura, 1989, pp. 182-186; Sumita, 1992, pp. 83-84
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It was originally expected that JR East would also be one of the
investors in the quasi-public corporation 22. However, JR East refused
the investment because it feared that the levels of expense might go
up so high that its financial stability would be threatened. JR East
anticipated that the quasi-public corporation would take the annual
loss of 100 billion yen, which was equivalent to JR East's annual net
income.
Eventually, other companies such as real estate businesses and
private railroads which adjoined with the line, invested and the
quasi-public corporation was established in March 1991. JR East
faced public criticism that it did not care about the public interests
partly because the line was expected to reduce the congestion of the
parallel Joban Line (Tatezawa, 1992, p. 63).
This episode has illustrated the following two issues which
indicate the relationships between the public and railroads after the
privatization of JNR. First, social expectations for better railroad
service are sometimes not fulfilled because of the JR Companies'
limitations in capital investment. Second, the JR Companies can
refuse to fulfill some social expectations to maintain their financial
viability without any obvious sanctions.
22 JR East was expected to invest 25 percent of the stocks, while local
governments and other private companies had the shares of 50 and 25 percent
respectively.
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2.7 Relationships among the JR Companies
Previous concerns about division have not materialized. Through
trains among the JR Companies continue to operate, and JNR's fare
rules have been maintained. Nevertheless, the relationships among
the JR Companies were sometimes questioned as "The New
Shinagawa Station Problem23,"
Due to the rapid passenger increase since the reform, JR Central
faced a shortage of track capacity on the Tokaido Shinkansen, which
belongs to JR Central (Figure 2-7). In May 1990, JR Central
announced that it wanted to build a new Shinkansen station at
Shinagawa (7 km from Tokyo Station, the terminal) to raise the
capacity of JR Central's Shinkansen. Although JNR had predicted that
the traffic of the Shinkansen would decline gradually, the number of
passengers rose since the reform; the number of trains reached the
capacity limit at Tokyo Station; many passengers could not be seated.
Tokyo station handled 11 departing and 11 arriving trains of JR
Central's Shinkansen per hour. The New Shinagawa Station would
allow 15 trains per hour per direction. As JR Central did not have
land for the station, it proposed that JR East sell a piece of land from
a depot adjacent to the JR Central line at book value, which was much
cheaper than the real value. JR Central said that the division of JNR
should be revised because the reform was planned when Tokaido
23 See Tatezawa 1992, pp.90-102; Kojima, 1990, pp.80-89; Takarabe, 1993,
pp.190-197; Irie, 1993.
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Figure 2-7 Increase of Traffic in Tokaido Shinkansen
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Shinkansen traffic was declining. JNR had had the same plan, but the
plan had not been carried out because of the traffic decrease.
JR East asserted that the division of JNR should not be changed;
any change would give rise to innumerable complaints from the JR
Companies, leading to the collapse of the agreements between the JR
Companies. JR East was also critical of the fact that JR Central
contacted the Ministry of Transport before JR East, undermining the
independence from governmental intervention. JR Central countered
that the way of dividing JNR was in question, and had thus contacted
the ministry first. Ultimately, JR Central agreed with JR East to use
other land.
Such a conflict between the companies would not have happened
if JNR had not been divided.
2.8 The Construction of MAGLEV Test Line (Kojima, 1990)
Soon after the reform, JR Central began to suggest strongly the
necessity for building MAGLEV (magnetic levitated trains) between
Tokyo and Osaka. There are two reasons for JR Central's view. First,
the traffic on the Tokaido Shinkansen reached its track capacity
(Section 2.7). JR Central stated that the New Shinagawa Station could
only solve the immediate congestion problem and that a new right-
of-way would be necessary to deal with further traffic growth.
Second, JR Central realized that the infrastructure of Tokaido
Shinkansen faced deterioration and needed replacement within a
couple of decades, which would require a long halt of the train
operation. JR Central launched a campaign to build MAGLEV, which
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would cut the travel time between the two cities to one hour, one-
third that of the Shinkansen. JR Central estimated the total cost to be
3 trillion yen and called for a public expense of 1 trillion 24.
JNR began to develop MAGLEV in 1962. JNR had an experimental
facility of 7 km for model trains and succeeded in a test run at 517
km/h in 1979 (High Mobility Netwotk Kenkyuukai, 1991). However,
the facility was too small and short to test potential situations which
would happen in actual operation. The Railway Technology Research
Institute, which took over the development of MAGLEV from JNR,
and JR Central are now building a full-scale 42.8 km test track, which
will be part of the actual MAGLEV line (Figure 2-8). JR Central pays
two-thirds of the construction cost for the test track, and the
institute pays the rest.
However, MAGLEV is a very challenging technology; for example,
the superconductors used in MAGLEV sometimes lose their
superconductivity 25. JR Central states that it will convert the
MAGLEV right-of-way to a Shinkansen line that will allow a
maximum speed of 350 km/h if the result of the full scale test is
unsatisfactory.
It is noted that the inauguration of the full-scale MAGLEV
experimental project became possible after the reform, for JR Central
can now act very aggressively on its own local needs. Thus, the
24 Some have estimated higher costs. For example, the Ministry of Finance
estimated the cost to be 5-6 trillion yen. See Kojima, 1990, p. 50.
25 So-called "Quench Phenomena." See Kojima, 1990, p. 55.
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MAGLEV case is a good example how the division of JNR was
effective in responding to local needs.
2.9 New Transportation Policies
After the JNR Reform, the government began to be active in
public railroad investment policies as well in other transportation
modes. When the Ministry of Transport announced its plan of Seibi
Shinkansen, it enthusiastically stated, "This plan is the milestone
which symbolizes the change from a regulatory ministry to a policy
ministry, or 'the New Ministry of Transport."' (Miura, 1989, p. 171)
2.9.1 Master Plan of Future Railroads
As the railroad's performance after the reform had been
expressed as "the rehabilitation of the railroads" (Kakumoto, 1992),
the Ministry of Transport felt the social need to upgrade railroad
service. The ministry had "Un'yu Seisaku Shingikai" 26 propose the
basic strategies for the capital investment in railroads. After a one-
year-long discussion, the commission submitted the report "21 Seiki
ni Mukete no Chuu Chouki no Tetsudou Seibi ni Kansuru Kihonteki
Kangaekata ni Tsuite"27 in June 1992. The main issues of the
report28 are as follows:
26 It can be translated as "Transportation Policy Commission"
27 The proposal can be translated as "Basic Concepts for Middle and Long Term
Capital Investments in Railroads for the 21st Century."
28 The text of the report was quoted from the Ministry of Transport, 21 Seiki ni
Mukete no Chuu Chouki no Tetsudou Seibi ni Kansuru Kihonteki Kangaekata ni
Tsuite o Yomu , 1992, and translated by the author of this thesis.
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"(1) Current Circumstances relating to Railroads
The transportation infrastructure needs investment for national
economic development without regional inequality and a society
where people can feel affluence. The public expectation upon
railroads is growing because of their advantages in terms of the
global environment, energy consumption, space limitation in urban
areas, and the labor shortage in Japan. After the JNR Reform, capital
investment in railroad infrastructure has been led mostly by private
companies29. Hence, the basic directions of the investment should be
established.
(2) Major Goals
a) Intercity Transportation: Raise the average speed of intercity
services, which is currently less than 100 km/h, to 120 km/h in the
long run. There are several options to do that: Seibi Shinkansen, the
speed-up of conventional lines, and so on.
b) Commuter Transportation: Reduce congestion in metropolitan
areas, especially in Tokyo. The number of rail commuters flowing
into Tokyo has been increasing (Figure 2-9), but the rise in capacity
has not been satisfactory (Figure 2-10)30. The countermeasures
29 The Seibi Shinkansen plan was led by congressmen and the Ministry of
Transport, but this report calls for additional public aid for other investments
in speeding-up of conventional lines, increasing capacity of commuter lines,
and raising competitiveness of freight service.
30 When the ratio of the number of passengers to rail capacity is 200 percent,
the passengers are pressed against one another and feel considerably
uncomfortable. The ministry aims at reducing the ratio to 180 percent in ten
years; the passengers would still touch one another, but be able to read
newspapers in the trains.
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include not only building tracks or increasing the number of the cars
in a train, but also having office employees avoid rush hours and
introducing peak-load pricing.
c) Freight: Have more freight carried by the railroad rather than by
trucks (so-called "Modal Shift"). The measures are described in the
next section.
(3) Funding
a) The nation should aid the investment by extending the Railway
Development Fund's functions, exempting taxes, etc.
b) Local communities should aid the investment more.
c) Passengers should accept fare increases for better service."
Based on this proposal, the ministry is working on various
policies. For example, it has provided interest-free loans (which
cover only certain portions of the whole costs) for the New
Shinagawa Station, speed-up in conventional lines, the investments
for "Modal Shift," etc.
2.9.2 "Modal Shift"
The cause of the traffic increase in railroad freight was not only
due to the good economy and JR Freight's effort, but also the shortage
of truck drivers and road congestion. In addition, air pollution from
trucks was a problem. Hence, attracting freight traffic from roads to
rail was considered a social need. The government has taken the
following steps (Kandatsu, 1992).
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(1) Partial subsidy to raise the capacity of the busiest line by
raising the maximum weight of a train to 1600 metric tons from
current 1300 tons. The investment consisted of the extension of
sidings and the reinforcement of existing electric power stations.
(2) Encourage investment in equipment for intermodal
transportation by reducing the taxes for the equipment.
2.10 Public Offering of the JR Companies' Stock
The public offering and listing of the JR Companies' stock is a goal
of the JNR Reform, for it makes the companies purely private. The
listing was an urgent issue because JNRSC needed the revenue from
selling the stock as soon as possible. The JR Companies also wished
their stock to be listed as soon as possible.
The advantages of the listing for the JR Companies are as follows
(Tatezawa, 1992, p.42):
(1) The companies will be free from the special regulations
inherent to the JR Companies, such as on the personnel affairs of top
executives and annual business plans. Thus they will have the same
freedom of management as existing private railroads;
(2) The companies will be able to get loans at low interest rates.
After all of their stock is listed, the government will allow the
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companies to do "equity financing31," whose annual interest rates
will be 1 percent (Miura, 1989, p. 83);
(3) The morale of the employees will be raised for two reasons:
first, the listing will be the symbol of the employees' efforts since the
reform; second, the employees will be proud that the companies are
one of the major companies in Japan.
The major conditions of the listing are set by the Tokyo Stock
Exchage as follows (Miyamoto, 1993, pp. 228-229):
(1) The shareholders' equity32 should be more than double of the
capital;
(2) Stable Profit -- The operating incomes and the incomes before
taxes should be more than three-tenths of the capital during the
three years before the listing and more than four-tenths of the
capital in previous year to the listing.
Although JR East, Central, and West fulfilled the conditions to be
listed33, the listing was postponed due to recent decline of the stock
market. On the other hand, the listing was expected to stimulate
Japan's stock market.
31 Equity financing is a measure of funding that is followed by the increase of
capital.
32 The shareholder's equity is the sum of the common stock, additional paid-in
capital, legal reserve, and retained earnings.
33 According to Tatezawa, 1992, p. 42, JR East's and Central's financial
conditions in FY1990 showed that they were eligible for listing in the next
fiscal year. According to Miyamoto, 1993, p. 229, JR West's financial conditions
in FY1991 showed its eligibility to be listed in FY1992.
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On October 26, 1993, the stock of JR East were listed. JNRSC sold
2.5 million stock, while JR East had 4 million stock in total. JNRSC got
the revenue of 1.07 trillion yens (Koutsuu Shimbun, October 30,
1993). The procedure for the listing was as follows (Koutsuu
Shimbun, September 1, 1993):
(1) August 6-11,1993: 600,000 stock were sold in open bids.
(2) August 30, 1993: Based on the average bidding price, the value
of a stock was determined 380,000 yen, while the face value was
50,000 yen.
(3) September 1993- October 1993: JNRSC received applications for
327,307 stock at the unit price of 380,000 yen. So far, the stock to
be sold amounted to half of JR East's total stock.
(4) October 26, 1993: JR East's stock were listed. Because of the
overheated demand for the stock, JNRSC sold 572,693 stock at the
unit price of 600,000 yen, which was close to the market price.
The Ministry of Transport has not decided when to list the stock
of JR Central and West and the remaining stock of JR East. JR Central
requested that the complete listing of the three companies should be
made at the same time (Koutsuu Shimbun, October 27, 1993); the
statement would indicate the competitive environment among the JR
Companies. However, Japan's stock market is getting worse. So, the
listing of the remaining stock can not be scheduled. Another
problem is that the Three Island Companies and JR Freight do not
fulfill the criteria for the listing.
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2.11 Summary
(1) The JR Companies have performed well in terms of traffic,
service level, and their financial conditions.
(2) New railroad policies have been decided and implemented. The
Ministry of Transport has been leading new private-public
partnership for building future railroads. The railroads' financial
viability has been prioritized by the government.
(3) Conflicts among the JR Companies have already occurred,
despite the few years since the reform.
(4) The public offering of the JR Companies' stock, which is a goal of
the reform and will benefit the companies in many ways, has just
begun. The whole listing will be accomplished in the distant future.
In the next chapter, the author discusses if the objectives of the
JNR Reform were really achieved by carrying out before-and-after
analysis.
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3. Has the INR Reform Been Successful?
3.1 The Dimensions of Evaluating the JNR Reform
The dimensions of evaluating the JNR Reform is as follows:
(1) Financial Improvement
(2) Railroad Functions by the Share of Traffic Volume
(3) Service Improvement
(4) Management
(5) Labor-management Relationships
(6) Political Issues
As the objective of the JNR Reform was to establish efficient
operation to help trim the domestic debt, financial improvement as a
result of the reform is discussed in Section 3.2. First, the profits and
losses of JNR and the JR Companies are compared by eliminating the
contribution of the interest expenses and the Shinkansen leasing
fees. Next, the total income statements of the JR Companies, JNRSC,
the Shinkansen Holing Corporation and the Railway Development
Fund are compared with JNR's income statements. Then the causes
of the improved efficiency, such as increased labor productivity, and
traffic growth are investigated. Finally, the JR Companies' future
financial viability is discussed.
In Section 3.3, the appropriate use railroad's capability (Section
1.5) is examined. In addition to meeting their financial goals, the JNR
Reform Commission expected that JR Companies would play
important roles in certain transportation markets where railroads
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have the advantage. The railroad's share of traffic volume will be
examined as an indicator of the appropriate use of railroad's
capability.
In Section 3.4, service improvement is discussed. First, the thesis
determines if the JR Companies have improved their responses to
demand, which JNR did not perform very well. Second, various
aspects of service improvements are examined. Third, the thesis
determines if any decline in the service level, such as safety, or
service in rural areas34, has occurred. Finally, the thesis discusses if
any inconveniences resulting from the division of JNR took place.
The thesis discusses management in Section 3-5. Most of the
criticisms of the "Opinions" proposal against being a nationwide
public corporation were of management. The quality of the
management includes many things such as the response to the
demand, investment policy, and technology.
In Section 3.6, changes of union policies, labor-management
agreements, and work morale are reviewed.
Finally, the effect of the JNR Reform upon political issues which
were not central to the reform is examined in Section 3.7.
34 That statement excluded the rural lines whose abolishment had been
already decided by "Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudou Keiei Saiken Sokushin Tokubetsu
Sochi Hou" (Act of Special Countermeasures for Promoting JNR Restructuring),
which was enforced in 1985. The abolishment, which included the takeover by
other sectors and replacement by private buses, was completed by 1990, and
the JR Companies operated some lines until then.
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This thesis limits the scope of the evaluation to the JR Companies.
However, it should be emphasized that the JNR Reform has left
serious problems, such as re-employment of ex-JNR workers and
repayment of the JNR liabilities to the JNR Settlement Corporation, as
the author discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. Although this thesis
shows that the reform was effective for railroad operation in many
aspects, it could be argued that the JNR Reform was not successful in
total because of these two problems.
3.2 Financial Conditions and Viability
3.2.1 Financial Improvement of the JNR Reform
In this section, the author determines whether or not the JNR
Reform actually resulted in financial improvement. Due to the
complicated disposition of the JNR liabilities, it is misleading to
compare simply JNR and the JR Companies in profitability and
financial condition.
An initial review examined the change in profits and losses due to
the elimination of the contribution of the interest expenses. JNR took
a net loss (excluding interest) of 35.7 billion yen in FY1986
because the net loss and the interest expense were 1,361.0 and
1,325.3 billion yen respectively (Table 1-1). In contrast, the JR
Companies made a net profit (excluding interest) of 759.8 billion
yen in FY1987 because the net profit and the Shinkansen leasing fee
were 50.0 (Table 2-1) and 709.83s billion yen respectively. This
35 The annual leasing fees in FY1987 and FY1988.
95
rough comparison suggests that the JR Companies made significant
financial improvements apart from the disposition of the JNR
liabilities. However between FY1986 and FY1987 the following
changes occurred. First, the JNR Settlement Corporation took over
part of the pension expense. Second, there are some transactions
among the JR Companies. Third, the accounting rules have changed
between JNR and the JR Companies. Hence, the exact evaluation
needs the following clarification.
The Ministry of Transport calculated the sum of the income
statements of the corporations which took over the JNR liabilities
(the JNR Settlement Corporation, Shinkansen Holding Corporation,
and the Railway Development Fund) and the JR Companies, as is
shown in Table 3-1 (Ministry of Transport, Kokutetsu Kaikaku Go 5
Nenkan no Seika to Kadai, 1992). Any transactions among those
organizations, such as the Shinkansen leasing fees and the trackage
rights fees have been offset. JNR's income statements have been
reorganized into the format of the JR Companies'.
The annual operating income36 has turned profitable since the
reform. Note that the operating income is smaller than in Table 2-1
because of the offset of the transactions. Consequently, the annual
ordinary loss has fallen from 1.9-2.6 trillion yen (FY1982-FY1986) to
1.0-1.3 trillion (FY1987-FY1991). The net loss has also declined.
36 The definitions of the operating income, the ordinary loss, and the net loss
are described in Appendix 2 (the JR Companies).
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That summed income statement is still an insufficient comparison,
because JNR, the JR Companies, and the corporations have received
subsidies and paid taxes as shown Table 3-2. In addition to the
subsidy for infrastructures (Section 2.5.1), the government supplied
the interest expense for 5.8 trillion yen of JNR's debt, as the JNR
restructuring plans enforced. After the reform, the JR Companies
paid fixed property taxes and income taxes, while JNR paid a special
charge for local governments. The government subsidies have been
reduced. Consequently, JNR received more public money than it
paid, and the new organizations have paid more than they have
received 37. The efficiency effect of the JNR Reform becomes greater
when taxpayers' expenses are considered.
Table 3-1 shows that both an increase in revenue and a decline in
costs of the JR Companies have contributed to the financial
improvement. The traffic increase was the cause of the railroad
revenue increase, for there have been no fare increases since the
reform (see Figure 3-1). The cause of the increased traffic is
discussed in the next section. The increased labor productivity
contributed to the cost reduction. Figure 3-2 shows that the JR
Companies have maintained their small labor force. The labor
productivity in the passenger railroad operation began to rise rapidly
in the final years of JNR and has continued to increase after the
reform, as Figure 3-3 shows.
37 FY1989 is considered an exception, for the government subsidized the JNR
Settlement Corporation largely to deal with the increase of the corporation's
long-term liability. Data are not available after FY1991.
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Table 3-2 Taxpayers' Expenses
Fiscal Year Tax etc. Subsidy Tax - Subsidy
Investment Loss etc. Interest
1982 35.2 729.4 183.4 200.4 345.7 (694.2)
1983 38.3 701.8 188.1 168 345.7 (663.5)
1984 46.3 647.4 174.6 127.1 345.7 (601.1)
1985 47.8 600.1 150.4 104.1 345.7 (552.3)
1986 50.1 377.6 N.A. N.A. N.A. (327.5)
1987 220.7 193.7 N.A. N.A. N.A. 27
1988 245.7 211 N.A. N.A. N.A. 34.7
1989 230.1 633.1 N.A. N.A. N.A. (403.0)
1990 299.4 157.1 N.A. N.A. N.A. 142.3
1991 444.3 108.2 N.A. N.A. N.A. 336.1
unit: 1 billion yen
Source: Ministry of Transport, Kokutetsu Kaikaku Go 5 N
Kadai, 1992; Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudou Kansa Iinkai, 1986
qenkan no Seika to
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Change in Passenger Revenue
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Figure 3-2
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Figure 3-3 Increasing Efficiency
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There are two reasons for the increased labor productivity. First,
as the traffic volume rose, labor intensity went up. For example, a
station employee who worked alone could deal with more passengers
than before. Second, labor conditions have been revised after the
reform, as discussed in Section 3.6.3.
The revenue from related businesses, such as retail, real estate,
and restaurants, has also increased, although their contribution to
total revenue is still not large. The JR Companies' revenue from
related business was 1.5 billion yen in FY987 and 2.7 billion yen in
FY1991. Its ratio to the total revenue was 4 percent in FY1987 and 6
percent in FY1991.
Table 3-1 shows that other operating expenses have not
significantly reduced. Although the companies paid lower prices for
purchasing goods (Section 3.5.2), at the same time they increased
repair expenses strategically. For example, JR East spent three times
as much as in the JNR era for maintenance (Sumita, 1992, p. 170).
Some special expenses for better service, such as the refurbishment
of stations and restrooms, caused the increase of the expense. In
addition, operating expense was increased for stabilizing their
financial conditions. For example, JR East repurchased their bonds to
return their long-term debt (Section 2.1.2), and the difference
between the actual prices and the book values of the bonds was
classified as operating expense (Miura, 1989, pp.71-72).
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Capital investment was reduced by one half compared to JNR, and
this also contributed to the JR Companies' good financial performance
(Section 3.5.2).
3.2.2 Financial Viability
The cause of the good financial performance of the JR Companies
is examined first. Section 3.2.1 demonstrated that the traffic
increase and raised efficiency were the major causes.
The following factors led to the growth of passenger traffic:
(1) Japan's good economy, which recovered from recession in 1986
(Sumita, 1992, pp. 8-9; Koike, 1992, pp. 8-9).
(2) The JR Companies' improved service level: more frequent
service, faster speeds, improved interior and exterior design of cars
and stations (Section 3.4)
(3) The JR Companies' steady fare levels since the reform (Section
3.2.1). During the same post-reform period, each existing private
company raised fare twice (Nonaka, 1992, pp. 72-75).
(4) The JR Companies' sales effort
(5) Increasing population concentration in urban areas, especially
Tokyo (Figure 2-9)
Thus, the contribution of each factor is hard to evaluate. Some
say that the JR Companies' performance is simply the result of a good
economy; others say that the companies could not have captured
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benefits provided by the good economy if JNR had not been
reformed. Shoji Sumita, chairman of JR East, stated (Sumita, 1992,
pp. 17-19):
"Some critics say that the JR Companies' good performance is due
to the good economy and have nothing to do with the management.
JNR's performance shows that the criticism is wrong. The passenger
traffic during the JNR era was at its peak in 1974. After that the
traffic declined every year; in 1982 it fell to 88 percent to that of
1974. Meanwhile, GNP and the consumers expense rose up to 145
and 135 percent respectively; the traffic of private railroads also
rose by 17 percent. These figures show that the good economy
would not increase passengers if the railroad were operated by the
national railroad."
The increase in freight traffic is attributed to having no strikes
(Section 3.4.4, 3.6.1), JR Freight's sales effort, worsened road
congestion, and a shortage of truck drivers.
The JR Companies' financial viability seems to depend on the
companies' ability to improve service levels and sales efforts. As this
thesis discusses in Section 3.4, these factors were brought about by
the JR Companies' effective and efficient management and labor-
management cooperation. Hence, maintaining managerial quality
and labor-management relationship will be vital for the JR
Companies' financial viability in the future.
The JR Companies' financial viability will also depend on whether
they can increase revenue by raising fares. In many cases, urban
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transit lines of the JR Companies are monopolistic, and the
Shinkansen lines have fairly competitive power, so those lines will
make additional revenue by fare increases. In contrast, on other
lines, fare increases may result in the loss of passengers to other
modes. However, each line of the JR Companies has different power
to compete with other modes. Hence, each company's financial
viability really depends on the lines which the company has and the
strength of competitors.
3.3 Retaining the Functions of the Railroad
The JNR Reform Commission expected that the railroad would
maintain its important role in certain markets where railroads could
take advantage of their characteristics. The performance is
measured by the railroad's share of traffic. The JR Companies' shares
in passenger-km and ton-km were shown in Figures 1-1 and 1-2
respectively. As for the passenger traffic, the "Opinions" proposal
forecast that the railroad's share would decline gradually, down to
20.1 percent in FY1990 (see Table 1-2); actually it was 21 percent,
better than the forecast 38. The "Opinions" proposal expected the
freight railroad to survive by specializing in the markets where the
railroad could compete, such as bulk freight and intermodal services.
After the reform, the freight railroad increased its share in ton-kms
38 JNR forecast the share to be 21.1 percent (Table 1-5) in FY1990, but that
seems to be too optimistic; it forecast the private railroads' share to be 14.7
percent, while it actually was 13.2 percent. The "Opinions" proposal was more
realistic, for its forecast of existing private railroads' share in FY1990 was 14.4
percent.
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from 4.6 percent in FY1987 to 5.0 percent in FY1991 (the Ministry of
Transport, Suuji de Miru Tetsudou 1992, 1992, pp. 12-15)
Hence, it can be said that railroads have remained an important
mode of transportation.
3.4 Service Quality
3.4.1 Effective Response to Demand
Several examples show how the JR Companies have more
effectively planned services in response to demand than JNR did.
(1) After the reform, train schedulers could respond to demand
more effectively as follows:
(a) In the JNR era, basic train schedules were renewed every two
years. This has now been modified to once or twice a year (Ressha
DaiVa to Tetsudou Keiei, 1992).
(b) Before the reform, it sometimes took a few months to run
extra freight trains. JR Freight now does it in 3-7 days (JR Freight,
1987).
(c) Since the reform, train dispatchers can add cars to passenger
trains in response to demand. In the JNR era, such changes needed
to be scheduled previously (Ressha Daiya to Tetsudou Keiei, 1992)39.
39 Stated by JR Central's employee. It is not stated when the changes were to
be scheduled in JNR.
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The following causes were considered to have improved the
effective response of train schedule to demand.
(a) Managerial changes (Section 3.5.5)
(b) Labor union policy became cooperative with companies and
enabled quick decisions (Section 3.6.4).
(c) Managers began to consider customer benefit and revenue
increase seriously.
(d) Tactical timeliness in defeating competitors. For example, a
speed-up was scheduled just before the parallel highways were
opened because it was hard to recover once customers moved to
other modes (Koike, 1992).
(2) Although discounting in the competitive market had been
commonplace in the JNR era, the JR Companies were more flexible.
For example, the discount round-trip tickets between Tokyo and
Kofu40 for limited express trains, which are even cheaper than the
basic fare for local trains, were sold after the reform41. There was a
convenient highway bus service which took passengers away from
the railroad but the existing discount rate was not enough to win
them back.
40 100 km west of Tokyo
41 The round-trip fare for the bus, the discount ticket, regular fare for local
trains and limited expresses are 3,500, 4,100, 4,320, and 6,800 yens respectively.
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(3) The JR Companies have operated luxury trains, which gained
much popularity and drew public appreciation 42. This policy
adequately captured the recent preference of some Japanese
travelers who enjoy more luxury trips for more time and expense.
That public appreciation may have improved impressions of the
railroads.
(4) The JR Companies succeeded in building up new demand. For
example (Yamamoto, 1990, pp. 192-207), JR West began night trains
for skiers to Nagano Prefecture. JNR had night trains from JR West's
region to Nagano carrying only a small portion of passengers -- 40
thousand passengers in FY1986, while the total exceeded one million.
JR West began trains with better accommodations, closer destination
stations to the ski slopes and advertised so intensively that their
directors even delivered leaflets to ski-bus passengers. When the
book (Yamamoto, 1990) was written, JR West expected more than
400 thousand such passengers in FY1989. Through the
advertisement, JR West's staffs learned from potential customers
how these trains should be scheduled to meet current customers'
ways of enjoying life in ski areas; for example, trains should have
been scheduled before winter vacations43 so that passengers could
enjoy Christmas Eve there.
42 For example, sleeper trains "Hokutosei" have been running since March
1988 from Tokyo (Ueno Sta.) to Sapporo. They had coaches with luxury
accommodation and dining cars with premium dinner. Luxury cars are so
popular that they get soon sold out. The trains take 16 hours, so there is no
other attractiveness other than enjoying the trip.
43 There are enough reasons for JR West staff to think that the ski demand
emerges after Christmas. Japan has no Christmas vacation; the winter
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3.4.2 Intercity Service
Maximum train speed has risen in both the conventional and
Shinkansen lines, as seen in Figures 3-4 and 3-5. Those figures also
show how speed-up was stagnant in the JNR era. In conventional
lines, new tilting trains raised the speed at curves, and new powerful
railcars ran faster at slopes. The private companies' potential for
such technical innovations will be reviewed in Section 3.5.7.
Speed-up resulted in a shortening of travel time. For example,
the maximum speed of Tokaido Shinkansen between Tokyo and
Shin-Osaka was raised from 220km/h to 275km/h in March 1992,
reducing travelling time from two hours and 52 minutes to two
hours and 30 minutes. Table 3-3 shows the speeding up (in average
speed) of limited express trains in conventional lines, as well as the
frequency improvement. Figure 3-6 shows how JR Kyushu has
upgraded one half of its lines (Aoki, 1993) since the reform,
indicating speed-up has been an important policy (Section 3.5.2).
It has been observed that speed-up has certainly contributed to
the increase of traffic. Figures 3-7 and 3-8 suggest that the decrease
in travelling time and the increase in traffic happen at the same
time.
Many cars with sophisticated designs and good accommodations
have been introduced and gained much popularity. The JR
vacation begins after Christmas. In addition, there is often snow shortage
before Christmas.
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Change of Maximum Train Speed
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Table 3-3
Trains
Frequency and Speed of Limited Express
Unit of Speed -- km/h
Company From To April 01, 1987 April 01, 1992
Daily # Speed Daily # Speed
Hokkaido Sapporo Higashi- 14 88.0 15 95.7
Muroran
Sapporo Asahikawa 23 92.2 32 102.6
East Ueno Mito 26 99.5 32 111.8
Shiniuku Matsumoto 16 79.9 32 84.9
Central Nagoya Nagano 8 79.8 13 87.0
Nagoya Takayama 7 58.8 8 77.5
West Osaka Kanazawa 18 93.9 24 102.3
Tennoji Shingu 7 72.4 10 72.4
Kyushu Hakata Kumamoto 25 83.6 31 94.7
Kokura Oita 17 82.2 28 83.9
Note: 1. Only Regular Trains
2. Speed of the Fastest Trains
3. Include Express Trains, Excludes night trains
Source: Sone, 1992
Table 3-4 Frequency Improvement in Commuting Lines
Number of Trains in 11am-11:59
Company From To April 01, 1987 April 01, 1992
Stopping Raid Stopping Rapid
Hokkaido Teine Sapporo 5 0 6 2
Tokai Okazaki Nagoya 5 0 4 4
Kyushu Tougou Hakata 3 1 3 3
Source: Sone, 1992
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Figure 3-6 Speed-Up after
(JR-Kyushu, in July
Privatization
1992)
tion
narlruluu unuar oeeea-up
by JR-Kyushu
Speed is indicated by km/h. Speed in a curve "+X" means that the
speed is greater than the standard one by X km/h.
Source: Aoki, 1993
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Figure 3-7 Minimum Travel Time by Trains and
Traffic Volume Between
Tokyo (Ueno Sta.) and Kanazawa
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Companies invested intensively in cars (Section 3.5.2). Some cars
were designed especially for the lines where they were in operation.
JNR insisted on standardized, businesslike designs for operational
conveniences. The JR Companies prioritized passengers' comfort and
pleasure, so they chose ambitious design policies.
3.4.3 Urban/Suburban Transit
Urban/suburban transit has been improved in terms of
frequency, rapid trains44, and rolling stock. Table 3-4 (East Japan
Railway Company, "Basic Frame for Division and Privatization")
shows examples of improved suburban lines.
Various cars with good accommodation were introduced to many
lines; in JNR's years most lines, with the exception of those in
metropolitan areas, were assigned old cars which had been used in
metropolitan areas (Ressha Daiva to Tetsudou Keiei, 1992). Similar to
the intercity services (Section 3.4.2), the design of commuter cars has
now become ambitious; double-decker cars with many seats and 6-
door (per one side) cars with no seats in rush hours were newly
developed for specific needs.
Although JNR offered frequent service in the Shuto (Tokyo
metropolitan) and Kansai (Osaka metropolitan) areas, it only offered
infrequent service in other cities until 1982. Even in the Kansai area,
where severe competition has existed among parallel JNR lines and
private railroads, JNR lost markets. There are two reasons why
44 Express trains without extra charges.
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transit service used to be ineffective. First, JNR's very strong
headquarters were unfamiliar to local demands (Yamamoto, 1990,
pp. 136-138, 152). Second, JNR was so inefficient that transit service
did not pay. JNR began to provide frequent transit service in 1982
and succeeded in attracting passengers. The JNR Reform Commission
acknowledged that the transit service is one of the business areas in
which the railroad has advantages (Section 1.5). The JR Companies
developed this business area still further. For example, JR West,
whose main area is Kansai, increased the number of passengers by
40.3 percent from FY1989 to FY1990. The traffic growth owed much
to the increase of short-distance passengers because the growth in
passenger-km was only 6.5 percent during that period (Sone, 1992).
3.4.4 Other Service Improvements
Since the reform, employees' greetings and attitudes toward
passengers have been improved (Tateyama, 1989, pp. 29-38). The
government reported that the percentage of people having "good
impression" of the JR Companies' service increased significantly.
Between the 1986 and 1988 polls, the percentage rose from 50.3 to
67.3. The increased rate of 17 percent was the second highest in the
17 organizations which were compared. In 1988, the JR Companies'
services attained the fifth highest appreciation in the 30
governmental corporations (General Affairs Agency, 1989). Two
issues account for that improvement; first, the employees see
passengers as customers, whereas JNR's officials used to think, "I let
you take a train" (Sone 1992). Second, the managers can now
discipline the employees (Miyamoto, 1993, p. 20); in JNR, such
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discipline was impossible because they did not control the
workplaces due to strong and leftist unions (Section 3.6).
There are many service improvements which could be done
without huge expenses. The managers' active and progressive
attitudes were observed (Section 3.5.4) (Arashiyama, 1989, pp. 15-
19). For example, stations, especially their restrooms, have been
cleaned and refurbished. JNR's station restrooms were criticized as
being dark, dirty, and smelly; the JR Companies accomplished this
improvement soon after the reform45.
As for reliability, there have not been any complaints that train
delay has increased.
The JR Companies agreed with their majority unions on the
declaration of suspending strikes (Section 3.6.1), which had
significant meaning for reliability in freight service, for repeated
strikes deprived JNR of freight traffic (JR-Freight, 1987).
Confrontational unions had strikes recently, but the effect was
minimal.
3.4.5 Safety
As is shown in Figure 3-9, the total number of accidents has been
decreasing since the reform. In FY1987, the first year of private
companies, the JR Companies had 927 accidents per year and less
45 See Arashiyama, 1989, pp. 28-36; Iwai, 1989, pp. 104-107; Katayama, 1989, pp.
226-235
118
Figure 3-9 Promotion of Safety
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Note: Train Operation Accidents include the following:
1) Collision of Trains
2) Derailment of Trains
3) Fire of Trains
4) Grade Crossings Accidents: Collision or Touch of Trains or Cars* in
Grade Crossings with People or Vehicles
5) Human Injury or Death caused by the Operation of Trains or Cars
6) Property Damage whose Loss is Equal to or Greater than 5 million
Yen caused by the Operation of Trains or Cars
Source: Ministry of Transport, Kokutetsu Kaikaku Go 5 Nenkan no
Seika to Kadai, 1992
* A Train means a composition of car(s) which are composed for operating
outside stations. A car in this page means a rolling stock which does not
consist a train.
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than in any year from FY1982 to FY1986. In FY1991 the number
declined to 760. Grade crossings accidents have also been declining.
Although the total number has decreased, serious accidents, such
as collision and derailment, have happened. Since the JNR Reform,
one passenger has been killed by an accident 46. However, more lives
might have been lost in other accidents because many of those
accidents occurred on freight trains, which means that there is less
potential for loss of life. The Ministry of Transport sometimes
warned the companies to take stronger countermeasures. Some have
questioned whether the JR Companies management has emphasized
operation 47 and efficiency at the expense of safety.
The JR Companies have taken many countermeasures. For
example, they have been investing in automatic train protection, car
detector in grade crossings, and so on. JR East has encouraged what
it calls "Challenge Safety Activity," meetings of workers to identify
and eliminate any potential causes of accidents (Iwai, 1991). Such an
activity became possible because of the increased morale and unions
cooperation. Nonetheless, serious accidents do occur.
Hence, it is concluded that safety issues need further
investigation.
46 Besides there have been victims such as drivers killed by the malfunction
of the warning signs of grade crossing.
47 For example, too much emphasis on operation might lead to hesitation to
stop the train when there is a fear of natural disaster.
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3.4.6 Maintaining Rural Lines
The JR Companies have not abandoned any rural lines48 which
they were supposed to operate49.
As for train frequency in rural lines, it was observed that train
frequency has been maintained since the reform in nine rural lines
which were chosen as examples (Sone, 1992).
3.4.7 Eliminating Any Inconveniences from Division
To insure smooth service between the JR Companies, a vast
number of agreements between them were made. They included the
nationwide fare rules such as long-distance discounts, rules enabling
through operation, and mutual dealing of tickets with some handling
fee.
So far, customers have had no clear inconveniences from division;
the agreements have worked well as intended. Through trains
among the companies are running. Even new through services have
been startedso. The companies seem to have a common interest in
having convenient train schedules. JNR's fare rules have never been
changed, so no fare increase resulting from divided calculation
48 One exception exists in the transfer of the 48.4 km-line between Wakura-
Onsen and Wajima in Ishikawa Prefecture (JR West) to Noto Tetsudou, a third-
sector railroad.
49 The JR Companies did abandon some rural lines whose discontinuation had
been decided in 1980.
50 JR West's ski trains, which were introduced in Section 3.4.3, are the
examples, for their destination areas belong to JR East.
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occurred; for example, JNR's long distance discount has been
maintained for through tickets between the JR Companies.
3.5 Management
3.5.1 Independence and Responsibility of Management
One of the major issues of the JNR Reform was the elimination of
political interventions in the railroad and the establishment of
managerial responsibility. The JR Companies' have never suffered
from political intervention, as shown by the following events:
(1) JR East could decline to participate in investing in the New
Joban Line, although the national government asked the company to
invest in the line (Section 2.6). JR East had no obligation for the
investment, and no sanction has been reported.
(2) No conflicts between the JR Companies and the government
have been reported in deciding the companies' expense for building
Seibi Shinkansen. (Section 2.4.2).
(3) The JR Companies' executives are now free from frequent
attendance at the Diet, which the JNR presidents had (Sumita, 1992,
pp. 17-19), and devote themselves to matters of management.
(4) Shoji Sumita, chairman of JR East, stated that he never had
unreasonable requests which ignored the company's financial
condition (Sumita, 1992, p. 156).
However, sometimes government involvement did take place.
The first type of involvement is inherent to the JR Companies and
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will never happen after the companies' stocks are listed. For
example, three of the JR Companies bought the Shinkansen
infrastructure from the Shinkansen Holding Corporation on October 1,
1991 (Section 2.5.3). There was an administrative decision in
determining the price (Tatezawa, 1992, pp. 80-88). The selection of
future executives, which necessitates the ministers' permission, can
also be a political matter5 1.
The second type of government interventions are related to
regulations and other administrative issues, which also exist for
private railroads in terms of fare increases, subsidies, other
permissions, etc. Using the power of these interventions, the
government would be able to control the JR Companies in various
ways.
3.5.2 Pursuit of Efficiency
The JR Companies have had much stronger motivation for
pursuing efficiency than JNR did.
(1) JNR had excessive inventory of materials and equipments, such
as rails. Its managers in the field wanted to have as much inventory
as possible. The JR Companies cut back on inventory. For example, it
is reported that JR West halved its inventories in the year ending
March 1989 (Yamamoto, 1990, pp. 78-82)52.
51 Tatezawa, 1992, pp. 143-151; Irie, 1993
52 As for JR East, see Katayama, 1989, page 44.
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(2) The JR Companies also cut the price of the goods they bought.
It is reported that JR East cut the cost by 5-6 percent in average, 10-
20 percent in some materials, and 50 percent in extraordinary cases
(Katayama, 1989, pp. 41-44). JNR's expensive purchases were partly
due to its original standards (Japanese National Railways Standards,
or JRS), which were enacted when Japanese products were of low
quality just after World War Two. JNR had standards for fluorescent
lights, which were of different sizes from those in common use, and
continued to purchase more expensive ones. The JR Companies,
however, abolished the JNR standards and started buying some
materials through open bids. They began to purchase foreign
products, while JNR bought only some machines for track
maintenance from foreign sources. Pandrol's rail fasteners and
Cummins' diesel engines (both from the United Kingdom) are
examples of this.
The independence of management contributed to such changes in
procurement, for the companies that did business with JNR had
political influence, which JNR needed.
(3) The JR Companies' capital investment policy has been changed.
In the JNR era, the dominant purpose was to increase capacity. The
JR Companies invested mainly in rolling stock and minor
improvements of tracks (Figure 3-10). The effect of the investments,
such as in speed-up and more comfortable trips, has already been
discussed in Section 3.4.
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The JR Companies' investment policy have been effective in
stabilizing financial condition because there has been minimal
investment in rights-of-way, which do not generally provide a
return, because the traffic does not increased to cover the
construction cost.
However, the investment policy will weaken the railroad's
capability to compete in the long-run, for highways and airports are
currently being built. Even with the state-of-the-art upgrading,
single-tracked right-of-way with sharp curves still has limitations in
competing with highway busess 3.
In addition, the investment policy will not fulfill social needs,
such as reducing congestion in rush hours. The JR Companies have
limitations in investment and sometimes disappointed
customers(Section 2.6). So, the government began to aid such capital
investment to fulfill public needs (Section 2.9). For example, with
interest-free loans from the Railway Development Fund and/or
subsidies from local governments, JR Hokkaido, East, and West began
construction of additional tracks to their commuter lines54
53 For example, As of July 1, 1993, JR Shikoku's state-of-the-art diesel railcars
run from Takamatsu to Kochi (159.6 km apart; single-tracked sections amount
to approximately 130 km.) in 2 hours and 14 minutes. Expressway buses
connect the cities in 1 hour and 55 minutes.
54 Koutsuu Shimbun, Decenber 8, 1993; Yamamoto, 1993; Deguchi, 1993
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3.5.3 Organizational Reform and Decentralization
The JR Companies simplified and integrated organizations,
contributing to effective and timely decisions (Section 3.5.5) as well
as efficiency.
First, factionalism prevailed in the JNR era; departments were not
cooperating with one another. The JR Companies integrated
departments both in headquarters and in branch offices. For
example, operational and marketing departments (passenger, freight)
were involved in organizing train schedules and negotiations
between the two departments took a long time. Now a single section
deals with train schedule. JNR's two departments dealing with
permanent way and electric equipments were also integrated 55 for
better communication.
Second, the JR Companies introduced integrated organizations
which take some of the power from the central organizations. For
example, a "Regional Stationmaster" (in JR East) is the chief of a
major station and has some budget and authority to cover various
organizations such as stations and depots in its area. An "Operation
Department" (in all passenger companies except JR Shikoku) is like
an independent railroad, containing stations and depots as a single
organization and can sometimes decide local train schedules.
55 There are exceptions, such as JR East's branch office of Tokyo.
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The JR Companies also reduced the number of managerss 6 from
which a proposal must receive approvals. For example, the number
became ten in JR East, while it was more than one hundred in JNR57.
The period for approval was greatly shortened, and enabled quick
responses to demand (Section 3.5.5).
The JR Companies decentralized power. The author has just
stated that integrated organizations, such as "Regional Stationmaster"
and "Operation Department," got more authority. In addition, the JR
Companies expanded the authority of branch offices, stationmasters,
the chiefs of maintenance depots, etc., to respond to local needs more
flexibly and more quickly.
Besides these examples, the JR Companies have changed their
organizations in pursuit of better ways of decision.
3.5.4 Morale Reform of Managers
After the reform, the JR Companies have had an atmosphere that
emphasizes challenge and practice. Executives tried to overcome
JNR's conservativeness (Takarabe 1993, pp. 168-169); JNR was
labeled as giving negative lessons (Sumita, 1992, p. 69). Managers
are encouraged to come up with many new ideas; for example,
56 A proposal must get approvals from all the sections which are affected by
the passage of the proposal. For example, to run trains, approvals from a
rolling stock department are necessary as well as from managers in a
operation department.
57 Those figures are based on Arashiyama, 1989, p. 150. As explained in the
previous footnote, those figures do not indicate the number of layers in
hierarchies. Other articles list different figures (Katayama, 1989, p.198, etc.).
As for JR Central, see Kojima, 1990, p.157.
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Shuichiro Yamanouchi, then-vice president of JR East, said, "Propose
everything that you could not do in JNR's ages (Iwai, 1989, p. 95)."
During the JNR era they were evaluated by demerits (Takarabe,
1993, p. 163). An advisor who was sent to JR East stated that they
had been using all of their potential and critical minds which had
been buried under JNR's various constraints (Iwai, 1989, p. 214). JR
Central's staffs were reported to begin feeling a progressive
atmosphere (Kojima, 1990, p. 157).
Several causes account for the change in attitudes. First,
management has been freed from the burden of government control
and political intervention. Second, many problems in JNR had been
criticized outside and inside JNR, and top managers knew what to
correct. Third, they do not have to spare as much time for labor
negotiations (Iwai, 1989, p. 95-96) and political affairs any more.
Chairmen were invited from private companies to work for the JR
Companies and taught the employees what private business was
like58.
Nonetheless, it is often pointed out that middle managers still
remain bureaucratic and conservative (Yamamoto, 1990, pp. 307-
309).
58 Several episodes telling the role of the then-chairman of JR West are
introduced in Yamamoto, 1990.
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3.5.5 Adequate and Timely Decision
After the reform, decisions have been more timely. In this
section, the author discusses the causes of the change, focusing on
train schedules (Yamamoto, 1990, pp. 136-157; Ressha Daiya to
Tetsudou Keiei, 1992).
Adequate marketing was brought about by the division of JNR,
decentralization, and the integration of organization. As for train
schedules, for example, JNR's operating department in the
headquarters had so centralized power that it controlled the use of
tracks and cars and determined train-kms for each branch. JNR
tended to emphasize long-distance trains, especially those connecting
to Tokyo, over local trains. The operation department did not
adequately consider demand, which was dealt with by the marketing
departments. Branch offices did not control their operating and
marketing departments, for the departments instead were controlled
by the relevant departments from headquarters. After the reform,
the divided headquarters could understand local affairs, branch
offices were given more authority, such as deciding their own train-
km, and relevant sections have been integrated.
Timely decisions were accomplished by the integration of
organization, the change of labor unions, and the simplification of
procedures to get an approval. Regarding train schedules, for
example, negotiations among the operation and marketing
departments in the centralized headquarters were very time-
consuming. Labor unions were very tough negotiators in changing
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train schedules (Section 3.6.3). The approval procedure was very
complicated. Since the reform, relevant organizations were
integrated, labor unions took a more cooperative stand, and the
approval procedure was simplified, facilitating the timely scheduling
of trains.
3.5.6 Personnel Policy
Personnel policy has been changed to motivate employees.
Before the reform, employees who graduated from colleges and
universities were classified into two ranks by their schools.
Employees of the upper rank were promoted to certain levels in the
hierarchy regardless of their ability and performance. Employees of
the lower group were discriminated against in the speed of
promotion and the final posts they could reach. This elite system,
which had already been criticized (Yayama, 1987, pp. 171-175), was
abandoned, and a single promotion system for all college graduates
has been adopted (Iwai, 1989, pp. 214-221; Katayama, 1989, p. 280).
Some college graduates of the former lower rank, and even high
school graduates, have been promoted to directors.
The JR Companies began to employ female college graduates,
while JNR never did 59.
The companies began to reward and penalize employees with
promotion, allowances, and so on. The companies can discourage
59 See Arashiyama, 1989, pp. 170-176; Katayama, 1989, pp. 269-279; Kojima, 1990,
pp. 158-160.
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absenteeism and promote worker's flexibility for unscheduled extra
jobs. During the JNR era, the unions were so strong that any system
of rewards and penalties were impossible, for the unions wanted to
protect rebellious members and discourage sincere workers.
Transfer of employees from one office to another has been
possible since JNR's final years; the companies could then allocate
workers flexibly. This was also made possible due to the change to
unions' cooperative spirit and the power balance between labor and
management.
3.5.7 Research, Development and Innovation
After the JNR Reform the JR Companies were eager for technical
progress. The companies admitted that JNR's technology had been
stagnant since the 1970's due to worsening labor-management
relations, financial condition, and bureaucratic inertia (Katayama,
1989, pp. 92-94); labor unions used to oppose full-scale tests and
any kind of innovation which might lead to labor cuts.
As was already discussed, train speed has been raised both in
Shinkansen and conventional lines after the reform. Figures 3-4 and
3-5 show the history of speed-up and how train speeds were
stagnant in the JNR era. Although most technology was developed in
the JNR era, JNR did not use it. However, the JR Companies
implemented it.
For example, JNR had already finished the essential developments
of JR Central's 275 km/h cars, which was introduced in 1992. JNR
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also developed improved tilt trains, which was introduced by JR
Shikoku in 1989. One of the innovations which the JR Companies
achieved is the use of new powerful diesel engines, including British
ones, enabling much higher acceleration than previous diesel railcars.
They got those engines through open purchase of materials (Section
3.5.2). Figure 3-11 illustrates the history of JNR and existing private
railroads in adopting innovations of electric railcars, showing JNR's
backwardness in technology.
In the field of track maintenance work, JNR's conventional lines
used only multiple-tie-tampers as mechanization tools. The JR
Companies have been trying to replace most manual labor with
machines, introducing ballast replacing machines, ballast regulators,
and so on. 90 percent of ballast change is carried out by machines in
conventional lines, while 100 percent was done by hand during the
JNR age. For this purpose they have bought many machines from
abroad.
JNR's information system was also backward over a few decades;
they introduced only MARS, a seat reservation system, and
COMTRAK, a Shinkansen traffic control system. Now the JR
Companies are developing various systems like train schedule
communication systems 60 and point-of-sales systems. Before the
systems were introduced, relevant workplaces, such as stations and
maintenance depots, had to read the documents showing train
60 This subsystem carries branch offices' operation plans to terminals,
stations, and relevant maintenance sections.
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Figure 3-11 Major Technical Innovations of Electric
Railcars: Comparison With Private Railroads
Tokyu
RR
Eidan
Rapid
JNR/JR
1954 1960 1962 1969 1986
*Flexible Joints for Traction Motors
*Regenerative Breaks
*Stainless Body
*(Kind of ) Thy ristor Chopper
*VVVF
1954 1964 1969 1991
*Flexible Joints for Traction Motors
*ALminium /Stainless Body
*Thyristor Chopper
*Regenerative Breaks
*VVVF
1958 1981 1985 1993
*Flexible Joints for Traction Motors
*Thyristor Chopper
*Rigenerative Breaks
*Stainless Body
*VVVF
Source: Ministry of Transport, Suuji de Miru Tetsudou 1992, 1992;
Asano, 1993; Ogiwara, 1993; Hata, 1993
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schedules; it took a couple of months to aggregate the company's
whole revenue.
Some companies61 introduced automatic ticket gates in urban
areas; employees previously had to examine tickets everywhere.
The JR Companies are introducing advanced automatic train
protection (so-called ATS-P) which could eliminate the serious
results of potential human errors. JNR's automatic train protection
was technologically backward because potential human error might
lead to a collision.
As for freight, the company introduced low-floored flatcars which
could load ocean intermodal containers (8ft. 6in. ISO Standard) and
high-powered engines which would pull heavier trains (Kandatsu,
1992).
The organization of research and development also has been
reformed. JNR had its research laboratory, which had developed
Shinkansen and MAGLEV. The laboratory was separated from
operation and became Railway Technology Research Institute. It is
supported by all of the JR Companies. The current budget surpasses
that during the JNR era (Figure 3-12). In addition, some JR
Companies established their own research and development
organization for the fields more closely related to applications. JNR's
research laboratory had been criticized as an ivory tower, so this
movement was welcomed for reinforcing applications.
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Improved labor-management relationships further contributed to
research and development and innovation. Cooperative labor unions
support mechanization, for it will eliminate inhumane physical labor
(Matsuzaki, 1992, pp.210-211).
3.5.8 International Cooperation
The JR Companies began to do business with foreign enterprises.
As mentioned before, they began to buy more equipment from
abroad. JR East endowed a professorship at MIT and is
communicating with many scholars there (Sumita, 1992, pp. 108-
110). JR East also established an agreement with the German Federal
Railway for exchanging information (Kouutsuu Shimbun, June 14,
1993). In addition to JNR's offices in New York and Paris, which the
JR Companies inherited, JR Central opened its own offices in Los
Angeles, London, and Sydney, to collect information (Kojima, 1990,
pp. 166-169).
There are several reasons for the companies' international
activities. First, the value of the yen rose, so foreign materials and
equipment became cheaper. Second, the JR Companies were freed
from politically strong domestic manufacturing companies, which JNR
had needed for lobbying to pass its budget and fare increases. Third,
there was strong leadership by some executives. Finally, the
companies thought much of improving their public reputation.
On the other hand, however, the capability to aid foreign railroads
technically has declined, for the JR Companies do not have many
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specialized staff due to labor cuts (Ministry of Transport, Kokutetsu
Kaikaku Go 5 Nenkan no Seika to Kadai, 1992).
3.6 Labor-Management Relations
3.6.1 Emerging Cooperation between Labor and
Management
JNR had several labor unions62 based on their political stands and
occupational categories 63. Most of the JNR employees belonged to
left-leaning unions influenced by communist ideology. The unions
lacked a full sense of the corporation's financial performance, held
repeated strikes, which were illegal in JNR, opposed raising labor
productivity, and sometimes had the members disobey work rules.
Some smaller unions had a labor-management cooperation policy, the
basic idea of which was that the survival and proliferation of
companies would benefit union members. In JNR's final years, the
left-leaning unions either changed their policy or lost members, and
cooperative unions became a majority. After the reform, unions
were reorganized based on their political creed (Table 3-5).
The change of labor unions has resulted in many other changes, as
discussed in Sections 3.6.2, 3.6.3, and 3.6.4.
The following causes explain why the radical policies in JNR's
unions during the JNR era could so heavily influence the labor
movements:
62 Those unions were composed of only the JNR employees. Such
organizational characteristics of labor unions are common in Japan.
63 Drivers, track maintenance, etc.
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(1) JNR lacked accountability for its financial condition. Repeated
political interventions increased JNR's losses (Section 1.2). These two
interrelated problems deprived the JNR workers of the motivation to
increase revenue and reduce cost. Hence, the employees accepted
the unions' communist ideology that workers were exploited.
(2) Due to the lack of accountability for JNR's financial conditions,
JNR's top managers suspended resolute penalties against illegal labor
movements for successful collective bargaining (Sankei Shimbun
Kokutetsu Shuzaihan, 1987, p. 137) and avoided further labor
disputes (Ohno, 1986 ,pp. 240, 284). Such policies meant the
triumph of the left unions' policy to break company work rules.
(3) JNR was very susceptible to political pressures. The unions had
strong political power and had parties pressure JNR not to take
resolute labor and personnel policies (Ohno, 1986, p. 279; Matsuzaki,
1992, p. 172). Hence, such radical unions were influential upon the
government and the JNR management.
(4) JNR discriminated in the promotion of employees on the basis of
their academic history. Hence, many workers felt sympathy with
union leaders rather than managers.
The different attitudes of the unions toward the reform were as
follows:
(1) The cooperative unions supported the JNR Reform, stating that it
was the only way to save the railroad from ruin (Matsuzaki, 1992, p.
14). The leftist unions were against the reform, saying that the
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reform would sacrifice public interests (Roppongi, 1988, pp. 36, 46,
47).
(2) Some members of the cooperative unions agreed with several
countermeasures for surplus workers, including working for other
companies temporarily, and moving from areas where the labor force
was redundant to the areas where the labor force was not as
redundant (Matsuzaki, pp. 52-154). Leftist unions told their
members not to agree with the countermeasures.
(3) In January 1986, JNR management and the cooperative unions
announced a declaration whose main issues were as follows (Ogino,
1986; Matsuzaki, 1992, p. 92):
(a) Obey work rules (including having no strikes);
(b) Cooperate in improving labor productivity;
(c) Cooperate in the countermeasures for surplus workers.
Leftist unions did not join this declaration although their right faction
wanted to do so (Roppongi, 1988, pp. 42, 50).
The fact that the right faction of the left-leaned unions quit the
unions means that they preferred the cooperative unions.
Some of the JR Companies have had new potential problems.
After 1991, the cooperative unions in some companies have been
reorganized again. In those companies, some unions are no longer so
cooperative; they have had strikes against productivity
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improvement. The difference is due to the power balance between
the labor factions in each company64.
3.6.2 Reconstruction of Work Discipline
JNR's leftist unions intended to do union activities in workplaces
to strengthen their organizations. In July 1968, in return for
productivity improvement, the unions had the management begin
collective bargaining over some issues in workplaces. Much of the
work hours was spent in the bargaining. Under the unions'
leadership, workers refused to do extra work, and absenteeism
prevailed. Managers were harassed every day. Workers wore
unions slogans corresponding with each campaign over an issue.
They worked only several hours a day. Managers were forced to
provide workers unauthorized allowances to have them work.
In 1982, low labor productivity and those unauthorized
allowances were revealed to the public, and a drunk engineman
crashed into a train with his locomotive. The mass media reported
the deteriorated work discipline sensationally. JNR took strict
countermeasures for reconstructing work discipline. In the same
year, JNR abolished any collective bargaining in workplaces.
Although leftist unions insisted that the old rules were the rights
which the workers had obtained, work discipline returned by the
end of JNR's days, due to the reorganization of unions and the threats
of losing employment. Today only a limited number of union
64 Tatezawa, 1992, pp. 132-154; Irie, 1993
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activists stick to the poor work rules which were commonplace in
JNR.
3.6.3 Change of Labor Agreements
While reducing basic labor hours, labor conditions have been
changed so that the labor productivity has been improving since
JNR's final years.
(1) The efficiency of crews rose due to the elimination of many
restrictions. For example, weekly work hours used to be within basic
hours that were agreed on between labor and management; since
1985, weekly hours could exceed basic hours, and crews were paid
allowance for extra work. As crews had been paid overtime
allowances based on how much they traveled, they did not lose
because they got more for longer and more intensive work.
(2) Job shifts were adjusted to the work load. In stations, employees
had 24-hour-shifts (with a few hours to sleep) and regular 8-hour-
shifts. However, the shifts were not adequate to cover morning and
evening rush hours. Hence, they also adopted new day shifts; for
example, a stationmaster can require employees to be at the station
by 7 a.m. and leave after 9 p.m6 5.
(3) Midnight jobs for maintenance staff began to be dealt with by
extra work. In JNR's age, workers had a day-off the next day for
many kinds of night maintenance work, such as rail replacement and
65 Such a shift does not necessarily continue each day for a given worker. The
next day, the worker will have a late shift or a day off.
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ballast tamping. The rule had been justified because such jobs were
hard physical labor. However, as those jobs moved to outsourcing66
and railroad employees specialized in supervising, that justification
lost meaning. After the reform, managers can make night jobs extra
work, pay employees special allowances, and have them at work on
the next day.
It is cheaper to pay special allowances for night work than to hire
more workers because the companies can save other labor expenses;
for example, bonuses, which are regularly given twice a year, and
health and pension benefits.
(4) One employee does a greater variety of jobs. For example, in
some rural lines, track maintenance staff work at stations in morning
rush hours before they begin maintenance jobs. In addition, one-
man train operation, or the elimination of conductors, began in some
lines. Like buses, drivers collect fare.
These changes in labor agreements have been possible because
labor unions are cooperative and do not oppose productivity
improvement. In the JNR era, labor unions strongly resisted work
force reduction. However, employment was not the unions' true
objective, for JNR had never laid off its employees since the 1950's.
As the unions could not win higher wages (see Section 1.6.1), they
had to fight for lighter work loads. Another true objective was to
retain their power, which was based on the number of their
66 In track maintenance, for example, JNR's/JR's employees only operated
multiple-tie-tampers and inspected turnouts (occasionally they changed ties,
rails, and so on.).
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members. After the reform, the cooperative unions understood that
productivity improvement can benefit their members.
The cooperative attitude eased the modification of basic train
schedule. JNR needed two years to change train schedule partly
because of the negotiation with labor unions. In organizing the
October 1978 schedule, for example, JNR planned to cut the train-km
of the freight service for the first time and had frequent discussion
with labor unions about JNR's future plan of the freight service for
two years (Kitsutaka, 1979). After the reform, train schedule is
revised once a year at least.
The labor-management cooperation also contributed to research
and development and innovation, for the cooperative unions do not
oppose introducing new technology or operating experimental trains,
while JNR's unions did.
3.6.4 Work Morale
As the power of the leftists declined, and the JR Companies
retained a good relationship with majority cooperative unions, work
morale improved.
In the JNR era, leftist union members tended to take a resistant
attitude against joining quality control (QC) circles, issuing
"improvement proposals," with which employees are supposed to
write about their jobs. After the reform, QC circles have been
widespread within the JR Companies (Yamamoto, 1990, pp. 82-87).
Employees have been writing more "improvement proposals"; for
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example, as is seen in Table 3-6, the average number of such
proposals in JR East was 8.7 per employee in FY1990, while it was
only 2.7 in FY1985 (East Japan Railway Company, "Basic Frame for
Division and Privatization").
There is regional imbalance of labor supply and demand: in rural
areas employees are redundant; in urban areas there are many jobs
in related business such as retail. Employees in rural areas come to
the urban area for a couple of years, leaving their family at home. In
the JNR era, employees could stay in their home regions (Iwai, 1989,
pp. 75-82)
The division of JNR also contributed to improved work morale.
For example, the employees of the Three Island Companies have
been especially motivated because they can not count on profitable
lines such as Shinkansen any more (Koike, 1992, p. 10).
3.7 Political Issues
As the author discussed in Chapter 2, the construction of
Shinkansen and new commuter tracks was investigated while the
JNR Reform went on. The JNR Reform had the goals of cutting the
national budget and retaining railroads' importance through sound
management. Providing new high-speed service and reducing the
rush-hour congestion can be considered other national goals.
Although the "Opinions" proposal charged the past investment
with lacking consideration of JNR's budget, it also called for public
subsidy which was appropriate for aiding private railroads. Hence,
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the recent subsidy systems after the reform are the necessitated
policies which was expected to follow the JNR Reform.
The policies are now done under clear financial responsibilities of
the JR Companies, while JNR's responsibility was unclear.
3.8 Summary
The JNR Reform's effects are summarized as follows:
(1) The reform gave the companies independence from political
affairs and the responsibility to live on themselves;
(2) The reform was effective as a management incentive;
(2-1) The personnel policy became fair;
(2-2) The JR Companies cut the prices in contracts and the amount
of inventories;
(2-3) The investment policy became more effective;
(2-4) The companies became more innovative;
(2-5) The companies adopted decentralized management,
facilitating adequate and timely responses to local demand;
(3) Labor-management relationships became cooperative. Labor
agreements were revised to be more efficient. The employees got
more flexibility for unscheduled jobs.
(4) The relationship between the government and the railroad
changed. The railroad is regulated in terms of fares, technical issues,
148
and so on, as are existing private railroads, and have special
regulations in personnel matters, etc. Nonetheless, the management
became far more independent. To fulfill public interests, the national
and local governments partially subsidize capital investments in
infrastructures.
The causes and effects of the policies and changes within the JR
Companies are shown in Figure 3-13. Those complex relationships
are also expressed in Tables 3-7 and 3-8. Table 3-7 demonstrates
how individual policies which were developed by JNR or the JR
Companies had effects on the changes. Table 3-8 shows how the
changes within the JR Companies caused other changes and enabled
policies.
In the next chapter, the author discusses the lessons of the JNR
Reform.
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4. Lessons of the .NR Reform
In this chapter, the author focuses on general lessons of the JNR
Reform. The effects of the individual policies taken during and after
the JNR Reform are important lessons for other railroads considering
privatization; those effects will be described in Section 5.1.1.
4.1 The Importance of Management and Labor Incentive
The revitalization of Japanese railroads after the JNR Reform
shows how the efficiency and effectiveness of railroads can be
influenced by management and labor incentives, incentives that
privatization would bring about.
4.2 Clarified Financial Responsibility of the Public
If there are strong political interventions in railroad operators,
they may be forced to fulfill public demands, such as building new
lines and keeping low fare rates, without enough financial
countermeasures taken by the public, and to accumulate huge long-
term debt.
If railroad operators are independent, the public is financially
responsible for the pursuit of these public interests operators can not
accomplish. Therefore, the governments have to subsidize railroad
operators for accomplishing such public interests.
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4.3 Inseparability of JNR Reform Policies
One may ask if privatization, division, financial countermeasures
(liability disposition and labor cuts), and operators' self-help policies
can be done separately.
In general, separate policies might be effective to some degree,
depending on specific railroads. In the case of the JNR Reform, the
effects would have been very limited. The JNR Reform policies and
the self-help policies combined to be effective in changing the
railroad because the drastic reform was in itself a motivation for
challenges and changes.
4.4 The Importance of the Performance of Railroads before
Privatization
The performance of privatized companies will depend on that of
national railroads before privatization. Although the JNR
management was inefficient and ineffective, its good aspects have
contributed to the positive performance of the JR Companies as
follows:
First, the JNR employees had high morale and concern for safety
and punctuality (Sumita, 1992, pp.9-10). Because of this morale, the
JR Companies have not had many accidents, despite a much higher
work load.
Second, due to repeated attempts to restructure JNR in the years
since 1969, conscientious employees had been aware of the need for
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reconstruction and had already acquired many ideas of what to
correct.
Third, the JR Companies' performance owes much to the
infrastructure in which JNR had invested. JNR invested in right-of-
way to increase the number of tracks, which have been important for
urban/suburban and intercity service. JNR investments, such as
centralized traffic control (CTC) systems, enabled the labor cuts
during the reform, although the effect of the investment could not be
utilized in the JNR era due to its strong labor unions.
Fourth, JNR had realized in 1982 that urban transit was, and
would be, a good market. This area became an important source of
the JR Companies' revenue.
Fifth, JNR was already aware of its technical backwardness and
was trying to recover. In 1986, the JNR engineers were shocked to
observe their own backwardness as compared to TGV's high speed
operations and efficient designs. JNR promoted research and
development, especially the speed-up of the Shinkansen and
conventional lines. Those techniques are now fully used by the JR
Companies.
4.5 Limitations of Privatization
Privatization has limitations, and some problems may occur, as
observed in the JNR Reform case.
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4.5.1 Unfinished Managerial Reform
Privatization is a fundamental organizational change. It takes
time to solve management problems, as is shown in the case of the
JNR Reform: it is an impossibility for the JR Companies to have
eliminated bad aspects of bureaucracies in only seven years.
It is doubtful the companies have really learned adequate
management in marketing, service, train scheduling, inventory
control, etc. (Sone, 1992; Konno, 1992). Although many successes
have been reported, many mistakes must have existed.
The JR Companies have not experienced a serious decrease of
revenue, in which the management quality of the JR Companies
would be tested. For example, the labor-management negotiations
over wages would be severe. Since total expenses have to be
slashed, each department and workplace would struggle to retain
enough of a budget.
The railroad is still monopolistic in many market areas. Although
the JR Companies have survived, they may not have experienced
severe marketing and sales effort.
Although the JR Companies are expected to develop their related
businesses, these businesses earn only six percent of the total
revenue (Section 3.2.1).
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4.5.2 Service Quality
Despite many service improvements, some services that are
incompatible with efficiency may be sacrificed. In Japan, for
example, ticket barriers have been mechanized, annoying many
people who are not used to the system. In some lines, congestion
became worse as the number of cars per train was reduced6 7.
4.5.3 Potential Political Interventions in Public Subsidy
Privatization can keep political interventions away from the
decisions made by railroad management. However, politicians may
influence decisions on public subsidies and reduce the effectiveness
of these subsidies.
Privatization can not solve problems in politics. These problems
should be solved separately from privatization in order to make
public subsidies effective.
4.6 Problems of Division
Even if the agreements among divided companies have been
successful in continuing through service and fare system, some
unexpected problems may occur, as follows:
The first example is the conflicts among the JR Companies, as the
author reviewed in Section 2-7.
67 For example, commuter trains were replaced by rapid transit in the Akita
area in December 1993, reducing seating capacity.
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Second, the negative effects of dividing JNR have appeared in the
area of technology. In rolling stock manufacturing, there is little
opportunity to communicate and share technical knowledge among
the JR Companies, threatening the long-term potential of the
industry 68.
In the future, the JR Companies may be entirely separate
companies similar to existing private railroads, and the present
nationwide fare system may not continue 69.
4.7 Adaptation to Socio-Economic Changes
The following examples show how the privatization of JNR
enabled the railroad to adapt themselves to socio-economic changes.
(1) Affluent Society
As the national income rose, the preferences of passengers
became diverse. For example, some preferred high quality service,
while others liked cheap service. On the other hand, transportation
modes also became diverse. However, JNR kept on providing
standardized services and lost markets. The JR Companies have
responded to customer needs. For example, they run luxury trains
for the passengers who wanted to enjoy riding trains.
68 Audiences' response in the lecture of Kurono, 1993, pages 24-25.
69 Wataru Yamada, former director of JR East, predicted that the current
agreement among the JR Companies would dissolve in the 21st century in
Kakumoto et. al., 1990.
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(2) Labor-Management Cooperation
Japanese labor-management relationships have been cooperative
for four decades in private companies, including private railroads,
because they thought that employment can not be retained without
the success of the company.
Since the wages of the JNR workers did not depend on JNR's
financial performance, they tended to fight for higher wages and
lower work loads rather than to work hard, hence obsolete radical
ideologists could lead JNR unions. After the reform, cooperative
unions became majorities.
(3) Change of Labor Preference
As the Japanese economy developed, young workers began to
dislike dirty physical labor. Although railroads were full of such
jobs, JNR's labor unions focused on abating work intensity, not on
mechanizing the jobs, for the sake of job protection. The JR
Companies are eager to mechanize their physical labor. The unions
are in favor of the mechanization because it may eliminate physical
labor.
(4) Global Economy
JNR's purchase from abroad was very limited due to the political
power of domestic supplies. The JR Companies purchase many
foreign products, have many chances for international
communication, and seek technology abroad.
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4.8 Summary
(1) Independence and responsibility of railroad operators, which
privatization of government railroads is aimed, give management
and labor incentive. Privatization also helps restructure the
relationships between railroad and government.
(2) Privatization clarifies the principle that the pursuit of the public
interests, which railroad operators can not accomplish is the
governments' responsibility.
(3) The performance of privatized companies depends on that of old
government corporations.
(4) Although the organization can be privatized in a day, it is a
long-term process to change the ways of management into those of
private companies.
(5) Due to the flexibility of management, privatization of railroads
will enable the adaptation to socio-economic changes .
In the next chapter, the author discusses suggestions for other
railroad considering privatization and the JR Companies.
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5. Conclusions
In this chapter, the author first discusses the effectiveness and
limitations of policies taken during and after the JNR Reform and
uses them as suggestions for other railroads considering
privatization. Next, from the analysis of the JNR Reform presented in
Chapter 3, the author draws suggestions for the JR Companies.
5.1 Suggestions for Foreign Railroads
5.1.1 Usefulness of Policies During and After the JNR
Reform
(1) Privatization encourages managers to improve their manner of
management and to be innovative. Privatization will also be a labor
incentive and may bring about labor-management cooperation.
Operators may be freed from political interventions and be able to
devote themselves to effective and efficient management.
(2) Division of railroads may enable more effective responses to
local need. Division of railroads may also be a management incentive
and a labor incentive. However, the effects of division depend on
specific circumstances of the railroad which is considering reform.
Potential operational problems resulting from division can be
avoided by agreements among divided companies (Section 3.4.7), but
some companies may be dissatisfied (Section 2.7).
(3) Financial countermeasures, such as disposition of long-term
debt and labor cuts, for the financial viability of privatized railroads
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are necessary to make privatization effective in motivating better
performance from management and labor.
(4) Privatization and/or division is a good opportunity to challenge
many policies and solve many issues; without such changes,
privatization will not succeed. JNR and the JR Companies changed the
ways of management and re-vitalized the morale of managers and
employees.
(5) One-time subsidies, such as the Management Stabilization Fund
(Section 1.7.4), insures the financial independence and responsibility
of the companies subsidized because the companies can not negotiate
the amount of subsidies once the one-time subsidies are given. On
the other hand, the subsidized companies' financial conditions will be
subject to interest rate fluctuations, which do not reflect efforts of
the companies.
(6) When adopting an infrastructure leasing system (Section 1.7.2),
uncertain future leasing conditions deprive railroad operators of
management incentives, as the dissolution of the Shinkansen Holding
Corporation has shown (Section 2.5.3).
(7) Partial subsidies which help railroad companies (including
existing private railroads) to invest in infrastructure (Section 2.5) is a
way to meet public demand which private operators can not afford
to do. Since railroad companies have to pay a certain portion of the
cost, they will carefully investigate the feasibility of capital
investments.
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(8) The Merger of organizations and simplification of approval
procedure will enable timely and effective response to needs
(Sections 3.5.3, 3.5.5).
(9) Decentralization of authority will enable timely and effective
response to local needs (Sections 3.5.3, 3.5.5). If local traffic is
dominant, this policy is recommended. In introducing these policies,
railroad operators should consider the effectiveness of such
decentralization, including the possibility that local authorities may
spend too much for responding to specific demands. Such
disadvantages could be eliminated by skillful management.
(10) Related business by railroad operators is recommended
because they can take advantage of externality of railroad service.
In fact, related related businesses may be incentives for improving
railroad service.
5.1.2 Characteristics of Japanese Privatization Policy
In some European countries, such as Sweden, Britain, and
Germany, operation of national railroads have been or are being
separated from infrastructure construction and maintenance and
sometimes privatized. They are expected to maintain and construct
infrastructure. Such policy was based on the concept of equal
footing. Equal footing is the idea that railroads should not pay
infrastructure cost to fairly compete with automobiles, which do not
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pay infrastructure cost. The JNR Reform did not adopt such
policies70.
The Japanese system, in which railroad operators are responsible
for maintaining and building permanent way, has several advantages
over separation of permanent way. First, track maintenance would
be improved by privatization (Section 3.5.7). Second, train operators
and track maintenance staff can communicate more easily. Third,
employees can be used more efficiently; that is, an employee can
work on operations and maintenance jobs the same day (Section 3-6-
3). Fourth, a railroad can invest in infrastructure based on their own
judgment.
On the other hand, the concept of equal footing will not be
accomplished under the Japanese system, which could cause a
suboptimal distribution of traffic and market share.
5.1.3 Special Nature of Japanese Railroads
The effects of the JNR Reform method on reforming other national
railroads depend on whether special circumstances in Japan apply to
other countries.
First, the JR Companies, with the exception of the Three Island
Companies, were expected to make a profit under efficient operation.
For countries in which railroads are not expected to make a profit
under efficient operation, a different method of privatization, such as
70 The Shinkansen Holding Corporation had the Shinkansen infrastructures,
but the JR-Companies paid infrastructure costs to the corporation.
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separation and privatization of train operation (Section 5.1.1), may
be adopted.
Second, in Japan, there is an incentive for carrying more
passengers by providing better service. Increasing passengers by
providing good service, rather than cutting service quality, pays
because of many possible reasons as high fare rates71, no freedom to
quit rural services 72, no freedom to lay off employees 73, and so on.
In many other countries, fares in the urban transit are set low to
attract passengers from automobiles. When privatizing transit
operation in those countries, the amount of subsidies needs to be
deliberately decided so that transit operators are motivated to
provide good service.
Third, JNR's employees had high morale for safety and
punctuality, although the work discipline was decayed (Section 4.3).
In other railroads whose workers has low morale, the pursuit of
profit may cause serious accidents.
Fourth, JNR's railroad traffic pattern was suitable for the division.
Most passenger traffic was within individual companies,
71 Figure 1-6 shows that the fare of the JR-Companies is more than twice as
that of the subways in New York for a trip longer than 15 km (1 dollars and 25
cents = 140 yen).
72 Abandoning rural lines needs the permission of the Minister of Transport.
In addition, railroads would be exposed to strong public criticism if they
abandon rural lines.
73 Due to Japanese social custom, a company never lay off its employees if it is
in good financial condition.
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5.2 Suggestions for the JR Companies
This thesis has discussed how the JNR Reform established efficient
railroad operation with effective responses to demand. However,
there are many issues which the reform has not solved as goals of
the reform. Taking limitations of the reform into consideration, as
well as its effectiveness, suggestions for the JR Companies are made
in this section.
5.2.1 Suggestions for More Efficient and Effective
Operation
(1) Managerial Reform
The JNR Reform has provided strong incentives for incentive.
However, such an incentive does not bring about overall managerial
improvements. The JR Companies' management techniques and
corporate culture may still be backward in some areas. The
management incentive may be a temporary one, and the companies
may become dominated by bureaucratic inertia again.
To get on with further changes in management, the JR Companies
should learn from other private companies about management
techniques and corporate culture. The JR Companies should also
monitor themselves continuously to examine if they have been
successful. To achieve improvements, the organizations within the JR
Companies should be kept active and innovative, free from
bureaucratic inertia.
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(2) Labor-Management Relationships
Labor-management relationships improved drastically since the
reform. However, current labor-management relationships and work
morale may be a temporary one. Employees have been motivated by
the uncertain financial viability of the JR Companies. Once the JR
Companies' financial condition stabilizes, such a sense of crisis will
not continue forever. In addition, both labor and management lack
experiences in private companies' labor
The JR Companies have to learn labor-management negotiations
from other private companies, especially from existing private
railroads. They also must learn how to deal with employees'
complaints, which is an important part of labor-management
relationships (Kamei,.1986).
JNR's labor-management relationships provide valuable lessons.
The JR Companies managers should learn past experiences.
(3) Surviving the Current Decrease of Traffic
As the Japanese economy is in recession, the JR Companies face
decreased traffic. Their quality of management is tested because
limited total expenses must be distributed fairly. The labor and
management have to learn to negotiate under severe financial
conditions.
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(4) Preparing for Social Change in the Next Decade
Adapting to changes in society is the key for survival of
companies. The JR Companies have adapted better to social changes
than JNR. They should be prepared for changes in the next decade.
First, the society will be more aged. Consequently, further labor
shortage will occur, and the JR Companies will have to cut back on
labor force and eliminate more physical labor. They should also
make railroad facilities more accessible to elderly people. The JR
Companies can improve accessibility (General Affairs Agency, 1992).
Second, customer needs will be more diverse and will include
luxury trains, cheap tickets, accommodation for group tour, and so
on.
Third, energy savings and global environment will be more
serious problems than they are now. Railroads have advantages in
energy savings, less air pollution, and less emission of carbon dioxide.
Railroads should provide better service to attract automobile traffic
from roads.
Fourth, international communication will increase. The JR
Companies should learn how to deal with foreign business, how to
cooperate with foreign researchers. They should also communicate
information, such as the lessons of the JNR Reform, with other
railroads.
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5.2.2 Railroad Relationships With the Government and
the Public
(1) Independence of Management
One objective of the JNR Reform is to prevent political
interventions in the JR Companies (Section 1.6). After the reform,
political influences upon the railroad reduced drastically, and the
executives of the JR Companies could make decisions independently
(Section 3.5.1).
There are still strong political and administrative pressures which
require the JR Companies to do something for the public interest
(Sections 2.4, 2.6). Second, the JR Companies may sometimes need
politicians' help 74.
The JR Companies should keep the following in mind. First, if the
government wants the JR Companies to do anything that may
threaten their financial condition, they should explain how their
financial conditions will be affected. Second, the JR Companies
should avoid excessive support from politicians. Third, the JR
Companies should learn from the existing private railroads and other
companies about how to deal with politicians. Finally, the JR
Companies should make the public understand the importance of
their financial viability, as the author discusses next.
7 4 See Tatezawa, 1992, pp. 105, 109, 145-151
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(2) Obtaining Public Understanding and Support
The JR Companies have financial limitations on service
improvement. However, the public tends to expect too much of
them. The JR Companies will have stronger public expectation than
existing private railroads for the following reasons. First, there are
expectations of completing JNR's unfinished projects, such as Seibi
Shinkansen and the New Joban Line (Miura, 1989, pp. 150-161).
Second, some people think that the JR Companies have special
obligation for public interests because they took over JNR's assets,
which had belonged to the public (Tatezawa, 1992, p. 63; Sumita,
1992, p. 161). Third, repaying JNR liabilities will need huge public
expenses. The public will expect something in return.
The JR Companies should tell the public why they can not provide
certain services because of potential financial problems. They should
say that excessive pursuit of certain public demands may threaten
other services. Also, the JR Companies should do their best to fulfill
needs and demonstrate that they can not afford to fulfill expectations
which are incompatible with their financial viability.
(3) Relationships with Subsidies
Because of high expectations for more and better railroad service,
the government will provide more subsidies to the JR Companies. It
is the JR Companies' duty to clarify potential social benefit which
public subsidies on railroads would produce. JNR failed to use the
national budget efficiently and effectively. Although the Ministry of
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Transport became more active after the reform, the JR Companies
know the transportation market better than the ministry. The JR
Companies are responsible for efficient and effective use of national
and local budgets for railroads.
It is also a duty of the JR Companies to justify the government
subsidy. Their efforts to make a profit by providing good service
will be effective for this purpose.
5.2.3 Eliminating the Disadvantage of the Division
Before the JNR Reform was enforced, people were concerned that
the division of the JNR would cause inconveniences. There have been
few inconveniences resulting from the division of JNR. However,
sometimes the JR Companies are not cooperative and conflict with
one another (Sections 2.7, 4.4.5), which may result in other problems
in the future.
Although the JR Companies will not agree always, the executives
of the JR Companies must prioritize customer benefit to keep the
promise that the division of JNR would not cause any inconveniences
to customers. The executives should also maintain and encourage
cooperation in operation, sales, and technology, remembering that
cooperation will result in scale economy.
5.3 Summary
(1) The the JNR Reform clarified responsibilities of the railroads
and the governments, giving incentives to management, and
establishing labor-management cooperation. However, the effects of
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such policies would differ depending on railroads considering
privatization.
(2) The JR Companies should improve their way of management by
studying other companies' techniques, monitoring their own
performance, and using JNR experiences. They should be aggressive
in developing public understanding of the need for their financial
viability. They should also be prepared to cope with the social
changes.of the next decade.
5.4 Suggestions for Further Study
(1) For further studies of the changes during and after the JNR
Reform, more precise comparison using more documents is
recommended.
(2) To evaluate the impact of policies taken by the JR Companies,
the causes of traffic increase should be evaluated, and the
effectiveness of train schedule, fare rules, and capital investment
should be examined.
(3) As for railroad policies after the reform, the functions of recent
pubic subsidy systems, such as interest-free loans, should be studied.
(4) The incentive effects of current regulations on private
railroads, such as fare regulations, should be examined.
5.5 Final Statements
Railroads have played a vital role in Japan. The JNR Reform,
which was aimed at establishing efficient and effective management
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by the division and privatization of JNR, was a complex process
which proceeds even now. The management should not relax but
maintain their efforts in improving their ways of doing business.
The JNR privatization also separated private and public
responsibilities to accomplish good railroad service. The railroad
management and the public should cooperate to build the future
railroad system.
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Appendix 1
Definitions of Terms Used in the Thesis*
(Existing) Private Railroads [SHITETSU1: This thesis refers to
the railroads which are not JNR or the JR-Companies as "(existing)
private railroads" unless specially noted. "Private railroads" are
owned and operated by private companies, local governments'
railroads, and quasi-public corporations.
JNR Liabilties, the [KOKUTETSU CHOUKI SAIMU TOU1: JNR's
long-term debt and other commitments to be disposed of as part of
the JNR Reform.
* Original Japanese Words are indicated with underlines in brackets.
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Appendix 2
Accouting Rules
JNR Accounting Rule
Operating Revenues consist of passenger revenues, freight revenues,
miscellaneous (including related business) revenue, and subsidies
except for capital investment).
Operating Expenses consist of personnel expenses, material expenses,
taxes, interest and bond handling expenses, and depreciation.
Operating Profit or Loss equals to operating revenues minus
operating expenses.
Non-Operating Revenues: Includes revenue for selling assets
Non-Operating Expenses includes "miscellaneous losses"
Non-Operating Profit or Loss is non-operating Revenues minus Non-
Operating Expenses
Net Profit or Loss equals to operating profit/loss plus non-operating
revenues minus non-operating expenses.
IR Accountimng Rule
Operating Revenue consists of pasasenger/freight and related
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business revenues.
I
Operating Expenses consists of personnel, material, which includes
Shikansen leasing fee, and depreciation cost.
Operating Profit or Loss is equal to operating revenue minus
operating expenses.
Non-Operating Revenues includes public subsidy (except for capital
investment). This kind of subsidy was temporarily done for some
ferry services and rural lines to be abolished.
Non-Operating Expenses includes interest
Non-Operating Profit or Loss Non-operating Revenues minus Non-
Operating Expenses
Ordinary Income equals to operating profit/loss minus interest
expenses.
Non-Operating Revenues includes public subsidy (except for capital
investment). This kind of subsidy was temporarily done for some
ferry services and rural lines to be abolished.
Net Income or Loss (JR-Companies) Ordinary Income or Loss plus
Non-Operating Revenues
Terminology in This Thesis
Profit/Deficit Unless expecially noted, "Profit"/"Deficit" means annual
net income/loss (after subsidy).
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Appendix 3 Abbreviations
JNR: Japanese National Railways, the
JNRSC: Japanese National Railways Settlement Corporation, the
MAGLEV: Magnetic Levitated Trains
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